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The Likely Mismatch Between
Federal Research & Development
Funding and Desired Innovation
Joshua D. Sarnoff
ABSTRACT

Scholars are beginning to develop theoretical analyses of the
different forms of government funding that promote innovation. These
analyses indicate the need for extensive empirical research into the
comparative advantages and various abilities of differing
governmental and private institutions. Currently, empirical analyses
are lacking, as data for such studies is rarely obtained. Worse yet,
analyses of the ways funding decisions are actually made indicate that
research and development funding decisions are not governed by a
theory of comparative innovation advantage. Accordingly, we can
expect a substantial mismatch between actual funding choices and
desired innovationpolicy.
This Article identifies practical considerations that affect
innovation-fundingpolicy choices. It describes why theories about the
preferred form of funding for particular contexts are not likely to
govern the actual practice of our policy-making decisions. The Article
concludes with the need to reinforce the political economy of our
innovation decision-making infrastructure by compelling greater
information collection and by requiringincreased transparency in and
documentation of the reasonsfor our government funding decisions.
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"[T]here seems to be no unique public strategy that determines
high efficiency levels[,] and more general conclusions about 'optimal'
policy mixes with respect to public [research and development] would
require [research]to go beyond the pure macroeconomic level."1

I. INTRODUCTION
Federal research and development (R&D) funding has shifted
dramatically over time. While federal R&D funding has increased
over the last few years, it has decreased as a share of gross domestic
product (GDP) and as a percentage of overall R&D funding. For
example, National Science Foundation (NSF) data shows federal R&D
funding as a percentage of GDP peaked at a high of about 2.0 percent
of GDP in 1963 and trended downward to a low of about 0.7 percent of
GDP in 2000.2 Thereafter, federal R&D funding remained relatively
constant until slightly increasing around 2008-2009 to roughly 0.9
percent of GDP. 3 Similarly, federal funding for R&D reflected a much
larger share of national R&D spending in 1953 and in 1970 than in
1994-1995. Specifically, federal R&D reflected about 57 percent of
national R&D spending at these earlier times, with about twice as
much funding going to federal laboratories than to universities, as
compared to about 35 percent at the later times, with roughly equal
4
amounts going to labs and universities.
These changes in funding shifted the balance of R&D funding
among
various categories
of research-basic,
applied,
and
university-based 5-and
between the public and private sectors.
Industry has been principally responsible for the net overall increase
in total R&D expenditures. 6
Similarly, industry has received
increasingly large shares of federal R&D funding, compared to

1.
Michele Cincera, Dirk Czarnitski, & Susanne Thorwarth, European Economy:
Efficiency of Public Spending in Support of R&D Activities, European Commission Economic
Papers 376, 2 (2009), http://ec.europa.euleconomy-finance/publications/publicationl4769_en.pdf
[http://perma.ccYW5E-2UATI.
2.
See MICHAEL L. COHEN ET AL., NATIONAL PATTERNS OF R&D RESOURCES: FUTURE
DIRECTIONS FOR CONTENT AND METHODS, SUMMARY OF A WORKSHOP 10 (National Academies

Press
2013),
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/18317/national-patterns-of-rd-resources-futuredirections-for-content-and [http://perma.ccNU92-YX3A] [hereinafter NAS PATTERNS] (citing fig.
2-1).
3.
Id.
4.
See Adam B. Jaffe, Trends and Patternsin Research and Development Expenditures
in the United States, 93 PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCI. 12658, 12658-59 (1996).
5.
See COMMITTEE ON TRENDS IN FEDERAL SPENDING ON SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING
RESEARCH ET AL., TRENDS IN FEDERAL SUPPORT OF RESEARCH AND GRADUATE EDUCATION 14,

(Stephen A. Merrill ed., 2001), http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10162.html
VJ25] [hereinafter NAS TRENDS] (citing fig. 1-1).
6.
See NAS PATTERNS, supra note 2, at 10 (citing fig. 2-1).

[http://perma.cc/3C42-
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intramural (within the federal government) research, university
research, Federally Funded Research and Development Corporations
(FFRDCs), and other recipients.7 It is less clear whether the shift to
greater reliance on private sector funding of R&D was the result of
conscious policy choices or political constraints on devoting
government funds to R&D during times of fiscal stress or due to other
political constraints. In 2001, the National Academy of Sciences
(NAS) recognized that the NSF "tended to increase its support of fields
whose funding from other sources is growing and reduce support of
some fields whose support is declining elsewhere."
While R&D
funding for the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the
Department of Defense (DOD) has increased, that funding is devoted
to a relatively narrow set of technological fields.9
The question is whether these changes are promoting the
development and diffusion of innovation more quickly and at lower
cost.
Comparative analysis of the effectiveness of different
innovation-funding forms requires extensive microeconomic analyses
of institutional characteristics, which are highly heterogeneous.1 0
Moreover, current analyses of what to observe regarding those
characteristics are typically made without theoretical guidance:
The various choices as to what to 'look for,' what economic phenomena to observe, and
what measures to define and compute are made with a minimum of assistance from
theoretical conceptions of hypothesis regarding the nature of the economic processes by
which the variables studied are generated.1 1

Even when theory is available to guide practical decision
making, numerous political, institutional, practical, and ideological
considerations
actually
drive
innovation-funding
choices.
Notwithstanding over $140 billion annual investments in R&D,
science policy debates are typically dominated not by a thoughtful, evidence-based
analysis of the likely merits of different investments but by advocates for particular

7.
See Federal R&D and R&D Plant Funding by Performer,AMERICAN ASSOCIATION
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE (AAAS), http://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/FedPerf.jpg
[http://perma.cc/GK6C-LFJ9] (citing National Science Foundation (NSF), National Center for
Science and Engineering Statistics (NCSES), Federal Funds for R&D Series, FY2011 & FY2012
data). See also National Science Board, Federal R&D Performance and Funding, NATIONAL
SCIENCE
FOUNDATION,
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seindl4/index.cfm/chapter-4/c4s6.htm
[http://perma.cc/23RJ-RJTW] (providing more up-to-date statistics).
8.
NAS TRENDS, supra note 5, at 5. Cf. Cincera, Czarnitsky & Thorwarth, supra note
1, at 8-9 (providing one possible explanation for differences in efficiency of innovation based on
crowding-in or crowding-out effects of public R&D support).
9.
See NAS TRENDS, supra note 5, at 4-5.
10.
See Cincera, Czarnitsky & Thorwarth, supra note 1, at 2.
11.
Irwin Feller, Science of Science and Innovation Policy: The Emerging Community of
Practice, in THE SCIENCE OF SCIENCE POLICY: A HANDBOOK 131, 137 (Kaye H. Fealing et a]. eds.,
Stanford Business Books 2011) [hereinafter SCIENCE OF SCIENCE POLICY] (quoting T.C.
Koopmans, Measurement Without Theory, 29 THE REV. OF ECON. AND STAT. 161, 161-72 (1947)).
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or
scientific fields or missions. Policy decisions are strongly influenced by past practice
12
data trends that may be out of date or have little relevance to the current situation.

These pragmatic and political considerations are the focus of

this Article. In Part II, this Article explains why scholars and policy
makers need more data to achieve meaningful evaluations of the

competing innovation-funding approaches. Part III reprises current
understanding of the theory of government innovation-funding
Part IV explains why innovation-funding decisions
choices. 13
systematically vary from what this theory might suggest would be
desirable, drawing from the developing fields of the "Science of Science

Policy" and the "Science of Innovation Policy. ' 14 Finally, Part V
expands on two of the recommendations this Author has previously
proposed:

(1)

compelling

greater

information

collection

and

(2) requiring increased transparency of the factors that affect decision
making and
15
decisions.

documenting

the

reasons

for government

funding

In particular, this Article identifies a need to expand the
tracking of outputs to innovation-funding decisions both to avoid
reliance on inadequate proxy measures and to better understand

Further, just as the National
funding decision processes.
environmental
Act (NEPA) required
Policy
Environmental
assessments (EAs) and environmental impact statements (EISs) to
improve government environmental-policy decision making, 16 we need
a National Innovation Funding Act (NIFA) to mandate requirements

that will improve our innovation policy decision making. 17 Some of
these requirements could be adopted by administrative agencies, but
others will need to be adopted through appropriate legislation.' 8
See SCIENCE OF SCIENCE POLICY, supra note 11, at 1.
12.
13.
See generally Joshua D. Sarnoff, Government Choices in Innovation Funding (With
Reference to Climate Change), 62 EMORY L.J. 1087 (2013).
14.
See generally SCIENCE OF SCIENCE POLICY, supra note 11.
See Sarnoff, supra note 13, at 1094-95, 1107-10.
15.
16.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (2014) (EIS requirement); 40 C.F.R §§ 1501.3-4, 1502
(Council on Economic Quality (CEQ) regulations addressing when an EA and an EIS are
required and listing requirements for EISs).
17.
Cf. Stuart M. Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural
Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 n.3 (2008) (proposing to create an executive entity that
would be able to force agency regulatory policymaking on innovation goals, noting that their
proposed "innovation regulator would logically also have a role to play in rationalizing
innovation-related spending").
Because the form of many funding programs is adopted by Congress itself,
18.
deliberative requirements for legislative justification would normally need to be adopted by rules
imposed on and by each House of Congress. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON RULES AND ADMIN.,
S. DOC. NO. 113-18 (2013),
113TH CONG., STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE,
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-113sdocl8/pdf/CDOC-113sdocl8.pdf [http://perma.cc/62RDARB8] (archived on Oct. 28, 2015); THOMAS J. WICKHAM, CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL,
AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 113-181
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These measures would improve our innovation-funding political
economy and better align our practice of decision making with our
theory of desired innovation-funding choices. 1 9
This Article seeks to highlight the divergence between
innovation-funding theories and actual innovation-funding practices.
To demonstrate the gap, the Article first briefly reviews the need for
empirical evidence to inform our theory, and then discusses why our
theory is sensitive to such evidence. The Article then explains why
the actual choices that we are making-and likely will be making for
the foreseeable future-are and will be based on factors other than
what theory suggests would be best. In short, it may not matter what
our theory suggests if our practices will continue to ignore it.
Specifically, Part IV illustrates eight sources of "deviance" from
desired innovation-funding policy choices by identifying the factors
that actually determine how our funding choices are made. These
deviant factors are: politics; regulation; globalization; networks,
power, and institutions; economics and psychology; stability of
funding; options and portfolio approaches; and ideology. 20 These
sources of deviance from theory actually dictate how innovation policy
is made. If one thinks only about lobbying and the defense and NIH
budgets, power and ideology (among the other factors) obviously play
an extremely large role in determining how innovation is funded. But
the role of these factors varies with institutional funding
decision-making practices; for example, some forms of NIH R&D
funding rely heavily on expert public inputs in competitive
peer-review processes. 21 There is no reason to think that power and
(2015). In contrast, ordinary legislation could be adopted to require (generically or in specific
authorizations for agency funding) that agencies provide Congress with reports to assist those
deliberations and to justify the form of funding choices left open by Congress. And agencies could
themselves adopt (within existing authority) rules regarding information collection and their
own decision-making processes.
In prior work, this Author provided a taxonomy of the various forms of government
19.
funding for innovation, including decisions to rely on product and market regulation as a means
of inducing innovation. That article also explained the relationships among the various funding
choices, described the limits of current knowledge of which form of funding would be most
effective and efficient in obtaining the desired innovation, and noted the need to find ways to
collect better data and to document funding choices in a manner that would permit better
analysis of comparative effectiveness. See Sarnoff, supra note 13, at 1092-1102, 1107-15, 111656. Similarly, as indicated by works such as the analysis of Nancy Gallini and Suzanne
Scotchmer of various incentive systems for innovation, preferred innovation funding form choices
are highly sensitive to a range of factors for which we lack useful and relevant information. See
Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?,
2 INNOVATION POLY & THE ECON. 51 (2002).
See Part IV infra.
20.
See, e.g., Andrew A. Toole & Fred Kuchler, Improving Health Through Nutrition
21.
Research: An Overview of the U.S. Nutrition Research System, US Department of Agriculture
(USDA) Economic Research Report No. 182, at 13-14 (Jan. 2015) (discussing USDA R&D
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ideology are highly correlated with innovation theory. Thus, this
Article adds to the broader call for reforming our political economy of
innovation policy making.
II. THE NEED FOR MEASUREMENT AND THE RELATIVE ABSENCE OF
DATA

It has been recognized for many decades that to determine the
effectiveness and efficiency of government funding choices, better
measurement is needed regarding R&D funding inputs and outputs.
In 2001, the NAS recommended that the federal government should:
improve data reporting by federal agencies on R&D expenditures, using improved
classifications by field and by uniform typologies, and administer the industrial R&D
spending survey at the business unit level;
obtain data on state and (through voluntary cooperation) philanthropic foundation R&D
expenditures; and
expand innovation indicators beyond R&D expenditures.

22

Since that time, federal data collection on R&D funding has
improved significantly (if not sufficiently) for information sources both
within and outside the federal government. For example, the federal
government developed a program called "Science and Technology for
America's Reinvestment: Measuring the Effect of Research on
Innovation, Competitiveness and Science" (STAR METRICS). 23 STAR
METRICS is led by NIH, NSF, and the White House Office of Science
and Technology Policy (OSTP). STAR METRICS includes data on
various innovation output measures such as job creation, scientific
knowledge measures such as publications and citations, social
outcome measures such as health outcomes and environmental
impacts, workforce outcome measures such as student mobility and
employment, and economic growth measures such as patents and
startups. 24 STAR METRICS thus clearly responds to the NAS
suggestion to expand innovation indicators.
Nevertheless, STAR
METRICS does not generate or analyze many sources of information
that are needed to determine which form of R&D funding may work
best in a particular context, as discussed below.
funding based on legislative formulas and NIH funding based on competitive grants, contracts
and cooperative agreements; also noting preferences of researchers alternatively for the stability
and predictability of formula funding or for the perceived higher quality of competitive, peerbased research), http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/err-economic-research-report/errl82.aspx
[http://perma.cc/9TNEDLDF].
22.
See NAS TRENDS, supra note 5, at 6-7.
23.
See About Star Metrics, STAR METRICS, https://www.starmetrics.nih.gov/Star/About
[http://perma.cc/4CZN-Z5BN] (archived on Oct. 28, 2015).
24.
See id.
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A. Measurement of Public Sector R&D
Unlike the private sector, which most often uses rate of return
on investment to measure outputs of private R&D funding
effectiveness, the public sector lacks standardized metrics-or even
standardized concepts, given the significant heterogeneity of practices
and R&D funding inputs and outputs-to assess the effectiveness of
public R&D funding. 25 Typically, private analysts of public R&D
effectiveness look at publications and patents as R&D output
measures. 26 These analysts may also look to internal rate of return,
benefit-cost ratio, and net present value when assessing the costs
avoided by industry through public R&D (typically infrastructure)
expenditures. 27 Similarly, federal granting agencies may look to
publications, patents, or other output indicators when making funding
Gathering additional data beyond publications and
decisions. 28
patents (which are already disclosed and accessible), however, is costly
and difficult and requiring the collection of such additional data may
29
discourage desired participation in government funding programs.

25.
See, e.g., Barry Boseman & Juan Rogers, Strategic Management of GovernmentSponsored R&D Portfolios, 19 ENV'T & PLANNING C: GOV'T & POL'Y 413, 414 (2001).
26.

See, e.g.,

COMMITTEE ON ASSESSING THE VALUE OF RESEARCH IN ADVANCING

NATIONAL GOALS, FURTHERING AMERICA'S RESEARCH ENTERPRISE 65 (Richard F. Celeste et al.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
Press
2014),
Academies
eds.,
National
[hereinafter
[http://perma.cc/2AA4-52EF]
books/NBK253897/pdf/Bookshelf NBK253897.pdf
FURTHERING AMERICA'S RESEARCH ENTERPRISE) (noting bibliometric-publication-and
technometric-patent citation indicators, among other output measures); Deborah Agostino et
al., Developing a Performance Measurement System for Public Research Centres, 7 INT. J. BUS.
SCI. & APP. MGMT. 43, 45 (2012) (discussing limitations of bibliometric and technometric citation
measures and use of "intellectual capital" measures). Cf. Rasa Lalien & Algimanta Sakalas,
Development of R&D Effectiveness Assessment System in the Research Organizations, 156
PROCEDIA-SOC. AND BEHAV. Sci. 340, 342 (2014) (distinguishing "[s]cientific performance" from
"[t]echnological performance" output measures of R&D).
See, e.g., Albert N. Link & John T. Scott, The Theory and Practiceof Public-Sector
27.
R&D Economic Impact Analysis 23-26 (Nat'l Inst. for Standards and Tech., Planning Report
http://www.nist.gov/director/planning/upload/report11- l.pdf
1,
2012),
Nov.
[http://perma.cc/RTR3-LFSP] (archived on Oct. 28, 2015). But see FURTHERING AMERICA'S
RESEARCH ENTERPRISE, supra note 25, at 55-59 (discussing problems with using rate of return to
measure public R&D expenditure effectiveness). See generally SUSAN GUTHRIE ET AL.,
MEASURING RESEARCH: A GUIDE TO RESEARCH EVALUATION FRAMEWORKS AND TOOLS (RAND
Corporation 2013), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographsfMG1217.html [http://perma.cc/W47STEYJ]; HANDBOOK ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PROGRAM EVALUATION (Albert N. Link &
Nicholas S. Vonortas eds., Edward Elgar 2013); ALBERT N. LINK, EVALUATING PUBLIC SECTOR
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (Praeger Pubs. 1996).
See, e.g., FURTHERING AMERICA'S RESEARCH ENTERPRISE, supra note 25, at 65-69
28.
(discussing NIH's Research Portfolio Online Reporting Tools, the Scientific Publication
Information Retrieval and Evaluation System, and the Electronic Scientific Portfolio Assistant
and noting limitations of patent and license metrics, particularly without holistic understanding
of the research system, including limited timeframes for analysis of metrics and value).
See, e.g., FURTHERING AMERICA'S RESEARCH ENTERPRISE, supranote 25, at 93-94.
29.
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These measures of outputs of R&D expenditures, moreover, are
unlikely to be used to make funding decisions, or if used may not be
used in any systematized fashion:
Systematic and strategic R&D program management is difficult to achieve in the public
sector. Even in agencies where program managers are relatively constrained, such
discretion as exists is usually exercised with "seat of the pants" [decision making],
heuristics developed after years of experience, and organizational tradition. In the first
place, government R&D management, unlike that in the private sector, usually seeks
public-domain knowledge and technology products, and, thus, the analytical
30
convenience of internal rate-of-return is not available to government managers.

In sum, agencies and analysts typically obtain relatively few
formal output metrics for public sector R&D expenditures, do not
always use these measures even when they are obtained, and may
employ idiosyncratic (and thus not comparable) methods of decision
making to determine the forms and targets of R&D funding.
B. Default Assumptions and Approaches
Given the data limitations and lack of systematic approaches,
analyses sometimes reflect underlying ideological beliefs regarding
preferences for market-based or governmental action. For example,
one review of R&D funding recognized that there may be tradeoffs
between the choices of government funding for private innovation,
which may include "R&D in the non-business sector, direct
government subsidies for private sector R&D, support for intellectual
property rights, industrial structure, human resources available for
science and technology[,] etc."'" Further, government financing may
crowd out private financing that otherwise would go to an area,
reducing the anticipated overall funding levels. 32 The review found
that "fiscal incentives can be effective, especially when firms face
financial constraints, but their overall impact on innovation appears
comparatively small. On average, tax relief for private R&D is found
to provide a stronger stimulus than direct government subsidies. '33
The unstated ideological premise of finding ex post tax relief
preferable to ex ante selection and subsidization of researchers and
research targets is the belief that the business community is better
situated than funding agencies to determine where and what to
research to achieve greater R&D outputs. Other economic analyses,

30.
Boseman & Rogers, supranote 24, at 414.
31.
Cinara, Czarnitski & Thorwarth, supra note 1, at 17.
32.
See id. (citing F. Jaumotte & N. Pain, From Ideas to Development: The Determinants
of R&D and Patenting,OECD ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT WORKING PAPERS, No. 44 (2005)).
33.
Id. (citing F. Jaumotte & N. Pain, Innovation in the Business Sector, OECD
Economics Department Working Papers, No. 456 (2005)).
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however, have challenged the implicit preference for market-based,
rather than publicly financed, R&D approaches, suggesting that the
choice to rely on government funding or private investment-normally
induced through IP rights-for innovation is highly contingent on the
particular economic and technological context, institutions (and their
34
knowledge base), and innovation targets at issue.
As Nancy Gallini and Suzanne Scotchmer have explained, IP
rights are not the best funding mechanism for innovation when "both
the costs and values of innovations are publicly observable to both
firms and public sponsor.''3 5 They argue that IP rights are an inferior
funding option because those rights generate deadweight social loss as
compared to government funding through procurement and because
monopoly pricing is thought to be less efficient than general revenue
taxation. 36 Of course, the application of the intellectual property
rights regime or funding through government sponsored prizes may be
more effective and efficient at achieving the desired innovations at
lower cost than government procurement for various reasons,
including revolts against general taxation to fund innovations, the
potential ability to elicit higher levels of effort, and the potential for
37
superior firm information to screen investments.
Substantial information about the social value of particular
innovation targets, the perceived value to firms of reaching those
targets, and both the absolute and the comparative ability of
particular firms to achieve the targets efficiently is therefore needed
to determine the preferred choice of funding among government
procurement, government-funded prizes, and government-supplied
intellectual property approaches.3 8 Complete information (or even
good information) on all of these considerations is almost never
obtained, and given the heterogeneity of funding practices and outputs
(as well as the difficulty of tracking inputs to outputs), it is practically
impossible to do so (even when government agencies make the effort to
try). Accordingly, the choice of innovation mechanism thus may
depend on whether the government-funding sponsor has any of the
relevant information. As Gallini and Scotchmer note:

34.
See, e.g., FURTHERING AMERICA'S RESEARCH ENTERPRISE, supra note 25, at 57-59.
35.
Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 19, at 54. Note that if one views the government
grant of intellectual property rights-which then induce private investment as a form of wealth
transfer and thus of government funding-then even reliance on the market is a choice of the
form of government funding and not a choice between government funding and inducing marketbased investment.
36.
See id.
37.
See id. at 54-55.
38.
See id. at 55-62.
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To solve the decision [whether to fund a particular innovation], delegation [which firm
to select for funding], and funding [how much funding to provide over what time frame]
problems jointly, all the information that is decentralized among firms may have to be
IP, prizes, and simple procurement mechanisms such as fixed-price
aggregated.
and
auctions cannot aggregate information, and are therefore flawed at the
contracts
39
outset.

Worse yet, information gaps may point in different directions

or create theoretical circularities of dependence on missing
information that cannot be avoided and thus compound the
decision-making problem. According to Gallini and Scotchmer:
If the sponsor faced only a problem of selecting the more efficient firm(s), then the
delegation problem would be easy to solve, e.g., by auctioning the right to invest. In
contrast, IP and prizes could lead to inefficiency....
But even an auction will not perform well when there is also a problem of inciting the
right amount of effort, so that the invention is delivered in a timely manner. The
appropriate rate of progress is key to the economics of R&D: How much additional cost
should be tolerated in return for a higher rate of progress?
A firm's willingness to accelerate invention at higher total cost depends on the prize it
will receive, conditional on delivering the product. Thus the size of the prize determines
the rate of investment. However, the optimal size of the prize (and the optimal rate of
investment) depend both on the researcher's "efficiency" and on his efficiency relative to
other firms....
The message here is that, even when the value of the prospective invention is known
and fixed
prior to the investments, optimal procurement requires a mixture of prizes
40
payments, rather than a pure prize system, a patent system, or an auction.

Even if we could solve the output measurement problem, there
would still be difficulties in reaching firm conclusions regarding the
desired choices of innovation-funding approaches. This is because (as
with any utilitarian balancing act) the choices would reflect differing
policy preferences, outcome valuations, 41 and approaches to risk
management. 4 2 These concerns are multiplied when considering
outputs, values, and governance structures that cross national

borders.

43

Id. at 56; see, e.g., NAS PATTERNS, supra note 2, at 36 (summarizing comments of
39.
Charles Larson that the National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics (NCSES)
censuses and surveys of R&D should collect more data on success factors in management
practices for R&D and innovation, on making R&D more effective in stimulating innovation, on
the impacts of risk, seed capital and labor regulations, and on measuring return on investment).
See Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 21, at 58-59; see also id. at 60-62 (discussing
40.
the difficulty of measuring cost or social value, which may lead to preferring intellectual property
and discussing the benefits of subsidies of reducing deadweight loss, but at the risk of
opportunism where the subsidy is received but the benefits are not generated).
See, e.g., FURTHERING AMERICA'S RESEARCH ENTERPRISE, supra note 25, at 71 ("The
41.
real challenge, however, lies in assessing the value of knowledge itself.").
See, e.g., NAS PATTERNS, supra note 2, at 36.
42.
See, e.g., FURTHERING AMERICA'S RESEARCH ENTERPRISE, supra note 25, at 74-81
43.
(discussing use of metrics by other countries, noting the potential to distort research efforts and
focus on lobbying efforts, and identifying difficulties of measurement due to time lags, causal
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As recently noted in the context of promoting technology
innovation for climate change mitigation:
[A]n innovation inducement system would perform better with prizes rather than
patents the more particular are one's goals and the more risk-averse is the community
of potential innovators. The system would work better by continuing to rely on patents
to the extent that goals are not known in advance and that the innovation community is
willing to take on risk. This leaves two other possibilities. If the goals are not known
(normally favoring patents) but the risks in achieving the innovation are high (normally
favoring prizes), grant funding may be the best option, where innovators propose
projects and the funder mitigates risk through covering or sharing costs. If the goals are
known (normally favoring prizes) but the risks are relatively low (normally favoring
patents), one might adopt a more market-based approach to procuring the innovation.
Laying out a more precise theory of these tradeoffs remains to be done-with no
guarantee
that mathematically formal results can be translated into useful policy
44
guides.

In sum, there are many variables about the participants in the
innovation ecosystem that would affect the choice of the desired form
of government funding for innovation. Policy makers usually do not
have sufficient information on the variables even if in theory they
could select an overall approach based on them.
III.

THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FUNDING CHOICES TO PROMOTE
INNOVATION

The discussion of the limits of measurement naturally leads to
the theory of government innovation-funding choices. The following
discussion briefly explains what scholars currently know about the
desired forms of government innovation funding.
A. Definitions and Limiting the Focus of Analysis
To understand the theory, it is first necessary to provide some
clarity about definitions. Innovation comes in many forms and has
many determinants. The myriad forms of innovation include: (1) new
technologies; (2) new practices that may be adopted by firms or
individuals; (3) user innovations, including platforms by which others
attribution, etc.); see also Fred Gault, Developing a Science of Innovation Policy Internationally,
in SCIENCE OF SCIENCE POLICY, supra note 11, at 156-57 (noting the "global, complex, dynamic,
and nonlinear" nature of innovation systems); cf. Nitin Chaudhary, Innovation Beyond Borders
and Across Industries: A Framework for Innovation Scouting, 47 LES NOUVELLES 69, 70-75
(2012) (discussing different approaches for identifying needed technology from different countries
for use in the private sector).
44.
Timothy J. Brennan, Prizes Versus Patents:A Comment on JonathanAdler's Eyes on
a Climate Prize: Rewarding Energy Innovation to Achieve Climate Stablization, 42 ENVTL. L.
REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10719, 10720-21 (Aug. 2012); see Jonathan H. Adler, Eyes on a Climate
Prize: Rewarding Energy Innovation to Achieve Climate Stabilization,35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1,
4(2011).
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can interact; (4) user-driven innovations, including user or producer
product improvements; (5) demand-driven innovation, including
procurement-based incentives; and (6) open innovation, including
includes knowledge flows. 45 The inputs that help determine these
firms, and other
innovations include: people; markets; governments,
46
engagement.
institutions; and international
Many forms of innovation must be considered when thinking
funding to promote innovation. This broad context
government
about
of innovation forms is important to keep in mind, as different
innovation-related activities or goals may invoke different institutions,
different economic interests, and different psychological motivations.
For example, consider innovation in government efforts to regulate the
use of marketed products, which could involve new innovative
business or consumer practices; new technologies for obtaining,
tracking, or monitoring information; or new technologies for control of
the products themselves. The heterogeneity of the innovation targets
and of the inputs to their production significantly complicates
theoretical and empirical analysis. This Article, however, focuses on
development of new technologies and the various forms of federal
science and technology (S&T) funding that are used to do so.
B. A Brief Summary of the Taxonomy of Government
Innovation-FundingChoices
There are many reasons why federal funding of innovation
through public financing and public domain treatment of the
innovation outputs may sometimes be preferable to relying on private
financing and distribution through market mechanisms that rely on
intellectual property rights. 47 The reasons to prefer government
funding include: (1) the deadweight social losses that result from
intellectual property in the absence of perfect price discrimination;
(2) the relative efficiency of broad-based taxation over single-market
taxation that results from IP rights; 48 (3) the ability to shift resources
to the most promising investments when initial approaches are
uncertain; and (4) the better ability to coordinate funding levels or
parties so as to avoid inefficiently low entry levels or duplication of

See, e.g., Gault, supra note 42, at 163-64.
45.
See id. at 166 tbl. 9.1, 171-79.
46.
See generally Sarnoff, supra note 13, at 1089-90; id. at 1100-02.
47.
See id. at 1089 (citing Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 19, at 54; Stephen M.
48.
Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, Procuring Knowledge, in 15 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ENTREPRENEURSHIP:

ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF

ECONOMIC GROWTH 1, 2, 27 (Gary D. Libecap ed. 2004)).
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efforts. 49 In contrast, there are also many reasons why private
funding of property rights and markets subject to government
regulation may sometimes be preferable mechanisms for inducing
innovation. These reasons include: (1) situations where firms have
superior knowledge and thus are the best investors of funding
resources 50 and (2) in the absence of specific market failures, markets
may be thought (based largely on ideological preferences) to work
51
better than government targeting of innovation outputs.
Accordingly, this Author has written about the need for (and paucity
of) comparative analyses of the nature, kind, and degree of innovative
creativity of actors in different government agencies and business
institutions and with regard to different market structures,
industries, and desired innovation outputs. 5 2 This Author has also
noted the difficulty of obtaining data for analyses, as collecting such
data may require assessing notoriously difficult concepts and
measures, such as institutional culture, expertise, or motivation.
These concepts and measures may also be idiosyncratic across too
53
many variables and thus not subject to meaningful comparison.
important
theoretical
Nevertheless,
there
are
some
considerations that affect the choice of government-funding
mechanisms even in the absence of sufficiently developed information.
The discussion in the sections below builds on and assumes knowledge
of the taxonomy of funding choices that this Author has previously
developed. These five basic choices-of which each choice has many
sub-species that may make the choice resemble a sub-species in
another funding category-are:
1.

Subsidies, which include: (a) direct ex ante or ex post, (b) prizes and rewards,
54
(c) consumption and production, (d) tax, (e) administrative, and (f) foreign aid;

49.
See id. (citing Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 47, at 21-23).
50.
See id. at 1101 (citing Brett Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking
the Economics of U.S. Science and Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347, 352-53 (2000)).
See id. at 1101, 1101 & n.61 (citing Frischmann, supra note 50, at 373, 389-90).
51.
52.
See id. at 1098 (citing, inter alia, Fritz Machlup, The Supply of Inventors and
Inventions, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS

143 (1962); Douglass C. North, The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development,
in THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT 17 (John Harriss et al.

eds. 1995); Robert M. Solow, On Macroeconomic Models of Free Market Innovation and Growth,
in

ENTREPRENEURSHIP,

ECONOMIES

15

(Etyan

INNOVATION,

AND THE

GROWTH MECHANISM

Sheshinski et al. eds.,

2007); Eric

OF FREE-ENTERPRISE

Stam & Bart Nooteboom,

Entrepreneurship,Innovation and Institutions, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON INNOVATION AND

ENTREPRENEURSHIP 421, 421-22 (David B. Audretsch et al. eds., 2011)).
53.
See id. at 1105-06 (citing, inter alia, Edgar H. Schein, OrganizationalCulture, 45
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 109, 111-12 (1990); DEVELOPMENT OF PROFESSIONAL EXPERTISE: TOWARD
MEASUREMENT OF EXPERT PERFORMANCE AND DESIGN OF OPTIMAL LEARNING ENVIRONMENTS (K.

Anders Ericsson ed., 2009); DAVID C. MCCLELLAND, HUMAN MOTIVATION 15-30, 43-48 (1987)).
54.
See id. at 1117-23.
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2.

and variable risk; (b) push
Procurement, which includes: (a) fixed-price, negotiated,
55
or pull mechanisms; and (c) different bidding forms;

3.

Direct development, which includes: (a) solely governmental development,
development with private entities, and (c) international
(b) cooperative
56
collaboration;

4.

Constructed commons, which includes: (a) physical and information infrastructures,
(b) public sector information, (c) various forms of encouragement to construct
privately managed (and sometimes government-regulated) commons, and
57
(d) standard-setting organizations; and

5.

Market regulation (the broadest category), which includes: (a) direct product and
process regulation; (b) information reporting and government disclosures;
such as
(c) recognition and certification programs; and (d) market regulations
58
market-entry, price, competition, and intellectual property rights.

As a recent analysis by Benjamin Roin suggests, the ability of
the government to regulate private returns in and through markets

(or through insurance
approaches

mechanisms) makes the choice-of-funding

even more complicated, as well

as less radical

and

polarized. 59 For example, the choice between relying on intellectual
property and on prizes does not really involve a necessary choice
between government price-setting and monopoly profits. Government

already sets prices through price controls and social insurance
schemes for the purchase of patented goods and can regulate directly

to avoid monopoly profits even when exclusive rights are granted.6 0 Of
course, the willingness and ability of the government to engage in
comprehensive price and market regulation to avoid monopoly pricing

of the sort envisioned is highly questionable. 61 This is particularly
true given the pervasive rhetoric in regard to intellectual property
rights that the government needs to "guarantee" sufficient returns on
and
pharmaceutical
for
patented
(particularly
investment
biotechnology inventions) in order to assure that investment in such
62
innovation will not be discouraged.

55.
See id. at 1128-31.
56.
See id. at 1132-35.
See id. at 1136-41.
57.
See id. at 1142-53.
58.
59.
See Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes: Refraining the Debate, 81
U. CHI. L. REV. 999, 1039-53 (2014).
See id. at 1013-15.
60.
61.
See id. at 1064-65.
62.
See, e.g., JAKKRIT KUANPOTH, PATENT RIGHTS IN PHARMACEUTICALS IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: MAJOR CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE 142 (Edward Elgar Publishing 2010)
(explaining that due to the resource intensity of pharmaceutical R&D and the claimed need for
high economic returns and perceived high risks, the pharmaceutical industry "demands a high
degree of patent protection to guarantee a relatively high return on capital investment")
(citations omitted).
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C. Comparisonof Funding Choices
As noted, choices of the form of innovation funding depend
significantly on the institutional characteristics relevant to the
particular innovation target chosen. Decision makers usually lack
relevant information on the comparative advantages of particular
individuals, firms, government agencies, or other actors so as to make
informed choices. Nevertheless, scholars and decision makers can
observe some basic comparative preferences that-if we gathered the
data-in theory could help us to identify which characteristics matter
and in what contexts.
The choice of the form of funding and whether to provide it ex
ante to generating particular innovation outputs (which may be
intermediary stages to product development) or ex post to generating
such outputs should, in theory, depend on many factors. These factors
include:
*

the degree to which the outputs can be reliably predicted;

*

the commercial (or non-commercial) nature of the research; and

*

in
the comparative effectiveness of government administrators and firm actors
63
making predictions, directing the R&D and generating innovation outputs.

For example, non-directive tax subsidies for R&D investments
are likely to generate the most innovation where private firms possess
greater expertise than agency funders, as control over the innovation
64
is left to firm actors.
In addition to these factors, the relative ability of government
or industry to obtain necessary information and other inputs will
affect the choice of funding forms. Although government may be
better equipped to compel confidential information exchanges and
cooperation among industry actors, particular firms may be better
equipped to attract needed expertise in the current climate given
limits on wages in government pay scales. 65 In contrast, funding
agencies can reduce some of the "information" risks regarding
innovation promotion by adopting sequential funding strategies 66 as
well as by using portfolio approaches that individual firms cannot
Nevertheless, such portfolio funding
themselves implement.

63.
See Sarnoff, supra note 13, at 1124.
See, e.g., id. at 1101 & n.59-61 (citing, inter alia, Frischmann, supra note 50, at
64.
352-53, 389-90).
See id. at 1135 & n.207, 1136, 1141 & n.234.
65.
See id. at 1118 & n.132 (citing Frischmann, supra note 50, at 367, 387); id. at 1131.
66.
Sequential funding can include, for example, multi-round subsidies or progress-payments.
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approaches risk duplicating research expenditures in the effort to
67
avoid reliance on single sources of R&D expertise.

in

the

Of even greater moment, the degree to which externalities exist
relevant product markets may affect the comparative

effectiveness of the choice of funding mechanism.
For example,
subsidies may be less effective than market regulation in promoting
innovation, both approaches may be more effective in combination,
and subsidies may be more effective than taxing the externalities
themselves. 68
To a large extent, the effectiveness of inducing

innovations and of regulating activities will therefore depend on:
*

the ability to quantify and monitor the relevant activities, and thus to
internalize costs through markets or regulation (rather than have those costs
externalized); 6 9 and

*

financial incentives to induce "strong" or "weak" innovation that are created
70
by intellectual property rights and other market regulatory doctrines.

The complete set of factors that affect both the incentives for
and the responses to innovation outputs are simply too numerous to

mention here, even if commentators could claim to know them all.71
Nevertheless, these considerations suggest that being a "repeat
player" in the innovation game-whether as an individual, firm, or
agency-may be an important consideration in developing the
relevant, needed expertise. Repeat player status may also encourage
greater funding stability, which can assure better maintenance of

efforts across various kinds of activities.
All of this analysis simply reiterates the point that significantly
more empirical information is necessary to be able to form effective

innovation policy. As previously noted, we collect insufficient-and
insufficiently useful-information on innovation outputs from
government funding inputs.7 2 Without that information, innovation
policy in practice is a game of blind man's bluff. But as the next Part

67.
See id. at 1125 & n.159-60.
68.
See id. at 1128 & n.171 (citing David Popp et al., Energy, the Environment, and
Technological Change 4-5 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14832, 2009)).
69.
See id. at 1143-44 (citing, inter alia, Popp et al., supra note 67; WILLIAM J. BAUMOL
& WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC
OUTLAYS, AND QUALITY OF LIFE (1975); Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, Whert Is
Command-and-Control Efficient? Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of
Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 887 (1999)).
70.
See id. at 1144-45.
71.
See, e.g., id. at 1145-46 (listing three general factors-willingness, motivation, and
capacity to innovate-affecting the ability of direct regulation to induce innovation by firms, for
each of which there are multiple complicating considerations); id. at 1151-53 (listing eight
competing factors that affect the desired strength and scope of intellectual property rights and
the various factors that affect the need for limits on those rights in research markets).
72.
See id. at 1106-10.
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will show, the actual situation is even worse because the players are
not playing by the same rules, and precious few of them are or will be
likely to be focused on what theory suggests.
IV. THE PRACTICE OF PUBLIC FUNDING CHOICES TO PROMOTE
INNOVATION

There are
at least eight factors that cause our
innovation-funding
decisions
to
deviate
systematically
or
idiosyncratically from whatever theoretical analyses might suggest
should be preferred choices. These "deviant" factors are:
1.

Politics, which includes the mission of agencies, the resistance of firms and
bureaucracies to Shumpeterian creative destruction, 7 3 and the opposition and
strength of incumbents;

2.

Regulation, which includes effects on markets and market entry, avoidance of
liability, and the shifting of research targets by firms;

3.

Globalization, which includes fragmentation of value chains in research and
production, strategic targeting of innovation outputs for firm or national
competitive advantage, human capital development, and managerial competencies;

4.

Institutions, networks, and power, which includes policy mandates, restrictions on
innovation, competing jurisdictional policies operating at cross-purposes, effects on
labor relations, industrial clustering, and race and gender inequalities;

5.

Economics and psychology, which includes actual financial incentives, intrinsic
motivations of the actors, normative appeals, and overall funding levels and level of
effort;

6.

Stability of funding streams, which includes funding surges that increase costs and
reduce productivity, leveling off of funding that results in project abandonment,
hoarding to avoid funding shortfalls that reduces output levels, and funding
uncertainties that affect target selection and timing of performance;

7.

Options and portfolio approaches, which includes temporal and segmented projects
and funding, reviews and evaluation metrics, milestones, and progress payments,
risk-reward ratios, and targeting expertise with multiple simultaneous approaches;
and

8.

Ideology, which includes preferences for reliance on markets or government
performance, preferences for market or government funding sources, crowding-out
effects of choices, effects on the choice of funding forms, and effects on ownership of
innovation outputs.

73.
See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 83-84 (3d ed.
1950); W. Michael Cox & Richard Alm, Creative Destruction, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ECONOMICS, http://www.econlib.orgflibrary/Enc/CreativeDestruction.html [http://perma.ccfPJT82YYW] (noting how capitalist economies open up new markets through a "process of industrial
mutation . . . that incessantly revolutionizes the market structure from within, incessantly
destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one") (citation omitted). See generally Spencer
Weber Waller & Matthew Sag, PromotingInnovation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2223 (2015) (discussing
Shumpeterian perspectives on antitrust law).
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Even if innovation-funding decisions were based on theory, the
influence of these factors on intermediate outcomes such as
competition, industrial structure, and network effects would
sometimes lead to unexpected results. 74 But these sources of deviance

make it much more likely that funding decisions will not be based on
theory.
A. Politics
Politics, both with a little "p" and a capital "P," largely govern
the level, form, and direction of our current innovation-funding

choices. At the non-partisan level (little "p"), politics determine which
federal agencies get created and funded and the extent of that

funding.

Politics also determines what policies agencies adopt in

regard to each of the possible funding forms discussed above
(particularly in regard to market regulation choices). At the partisan

level (capital "P"), it is widely recognized that Democrats have tended
to favor more extensive government involvement in and regulation of
the economy-including support for taxation and redistribution-than
75

have Republicans.
Politics also determine the mission and practices of federal
agencies, which can change with the political vicissitudes of political
76
parties and public whims.
[G]overnments support the advancement of science and technology mostly through their
support of specific missions such as defense or health, and it is the politics of these
missions, and the many contextual goals of government, that determines the rate and
direction of its research investments. Governments can also affect the supply and

74.

See Jakob Edler & Elvira Uyarra, Public Procurementof Innovation, in HANDBOOK

OF INNOVATION IN PUBLIC SERVICES 226-27 (Edward Elgar Press 2013).

75.
See, e.g., RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: U.S. INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 53 (Charles W. Wessner & Alan W. Wolff eds., National Academy of Sciences 2012)
[hereinafter RISING TO THE CHALLENGE] ("The U.S.... has tended to address specific needs and
goals through targeted, short-term legislation and with programs that shift from one
Administration to the next."); Partisan PolarizationSurges in Bush, Obama Years: Trends in
American Values: 1987-2012, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, http://www.pewresearch.org/dailynumber/deepening-divide-between-republicans-and-democrats-over-business-regulation
[http://perma.cc/39G7-U9FQ] (noting a "35 point gap between Republicans who believe that
government regulation of business usually does more harm than good and the number of
Democrats who share that view"); cf. Matthew Sag, Tonja Jacobi & Maxim Sytch, Ideology and
Exceptionalism in Intellectual Property:An EmpiricalStudy, 97 CAL. L. REV. 801, 811-15 (2009)
(hypothesizing that conservatives support intellectual property rights based on their support of
property rights generally, but intellectual property rights may be in conflict with conservatives'
dislike of government intervention in the market).
76.
See, e.g., Fred Block, Swimming Against the Current: The Rise of a Hidden
Developmental State in the United States, 36 POL. & SOC'Y, 169, 183-86 (2008),
http://innovate.ucsb.eduLwp-content/uploads/2010/04/Block-swimming.pdf [http:/perma.cc/7R7PN89J] (juxtaposing funding of federal agencies and research under Republican and Democratic
regimes).
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the budgetary process via
demand conditions for science and technology outside of
77
regulatory regimes, anti-trust, taxes, standards, and so on.

Thus, politics affects public support for innovation funding
generally, as well as public support for particular forms of government
78
action-particularly market interventions through regulatory action.
At the wholesale level of overall R&D expenditures, the politics
of agencies and missions largely governs the degree and nature of the
federal innovation-funding expenditures that get allocated. 79 For
example (as illustrated in Figures 1 and 2), there have been
continuing increases (in constant dollars) of federal R&D expenditures
over the last forty years, although the relative balance has been
shifting among basic, applied, and university-based research. The
increases in constant-dollar funding were more significant in the 2009
to 2012 range, which is explained in part by the infusion of R&D and
infrastructure funds resulting from the American Recovery and
80
Reinvestment Act (ARRA).
Figure 1.81
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77.
Harvey M. Sapolsky & Mark Z.Taylor, Politicsand the Science of Science Policy, in
SCIENCE OF SCIENCE POLICY, supra note 11, at 31.
78.
See, e.g., Knut Blind, The Influence of Regulations on Innovation: A Quantitative
Assessment for OECD Countries,41 RES. POL'Y 391, 391-400 (2012).
79.
See, e.g., RISING TO THE CHALLENGE, supra note 75, at 43-49 & Box 1.4 ("Federal
Mission Needs Drive Innovation").
80.
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 1101, 1141,
123 Stat. 115, 319, 326-28.
81.
NAS TRENDS, supra note 5, at 14.

2016] MISMATCH BETWEEN R&D FUNDING AND INNOVATION

Figure

383

2.82

Trends in Federal R&D, FY 1976-2015
in billions of comstnt FY 2014 dolhars
3200
MO
-Total

R&D

$160

$120
51100-N-4:efense

. ARRA - efense

$60

$20- - .ARA - Non-

Source.A
Research on(Dew opkP t reponsn Warys oappXpUaK o FY2014ngu-%are CU-entfnates FY2015 m e requs
ni uOes oNduct-lnac1
.Os
02014 AAAS

R&D

Changing national priorities will also change the mix of federal

R&D spending among agencies and in the forms of funding they
employ. As illustrated in Figure 2, defense R&D spending has been
increasing more than non-defense R&D spending. In 2008, about 61
percent of total government R&D was for defense; 21 percent was for
health; 6 percent was for space, and 6 percent was for general

science.8 3 To the extent that defense R&D is heavily weighted towards
procurement,8 4 the

data

suggest

significant

increases

in

R&D

expenditures based on the choice of procurement (particularly during

82.
Matt Hourihan, Historical Trends in Federal R&D, in AAAS REP. XXXIX: RES. AND
DEV. FY 2015 24 (American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) 2014),
http://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/15pchO2.pdf [http://perma.cc/BH27-8FKB].
83.
See id.; Richard B. Freeman, The Economics of Science and Technology Policy, in
THE SCIENCE OF SCIENCE POLICY, supra note 11, at 94.
84.
See, e.g., Subrata Ghoshroy, Restructuring defense R&D, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS
(Dec.
20,
2011),
http://thebulletin.org/restructuring-defense-rd
[http://perma.cc/6L9M-WBQN] (noting that about $12 billion of defense R&D budget was spent
for "productive research" whereas about $64 billion was spent on "development activities" that
"should properly be included in the production phase of weapons program budgets" and
explaining that "[mioving these development and demonstration programs, including the
classified ones, out of R&D and into defense procurement and production budgets will subject
them to the scrutiny that weapons programs receive"); William H. Pratt, Conducting R&D with
Government Funding; Great Idea, but How Do We Protect Our Intellectual Property Rights? Part
1 of 3, ROBOTICS BUSINESS REVIEW (Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/
articlesdetail.aspx?news=efd5c74d-bb3-47ae-85f2-9c8ca7a55b2e
[http://perma.cc/N26C-TLR9]
("Procurement contracts are often used by the government to procure a variety of... services,
including R&D."). Note that the Department of Defense formally distinguishes Research,
Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) from procurement in its budgets.
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the 1982 to 1992 and 2002 to 2012 timeframes). These shifts likely
reflect expansion in defense mission goals and changes in priority
among agencies more than they reflect conscious and deliberate
legislative decisions to rely on procurement as a preferred form of
funding overall.
Further, although overall federal R&D and total R&D have
increased in constant dollars over the 1976 to 2014 timeframe, federal
R&D spending has decreased as a percentage of GDP, as shown in
Figure 3. This indicates proportionally lower governmental R&D
research funding; further, there appears to be greater federal
divestment from defense R&D, at least since about 1986. Although
federal R&D expenditures were decreasing as a percentage of R&D
through 2009, business R&D was increasing, resulting in modest net
increases in total R&D funding as indicated in Figure 4. This trend
suggests that politicians may be substituting federal funding by
relying on private sector R&D funding, which also affects research
directions and triggers greater reliance on market mechanisms for
innovation targets.
Note that business R&D expenditures have
exceeded those federal R&D expenditures since the late 1970s, and the
gap has been expanding.
Figure 3.85
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85.

Hourihan, supra note 81, at 28.
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Of course, these changes are not uniform across all agencies or
scientific fields. As illustrated in Figure 5, significant increases have
occurred in the health budget (principally at the NIH), while there
have been smaller increases in general science R&D and reductions in
the space-related R&D budget. As the agencies themselves tend to
rely to different extents on the various forms of funding, the result is
to change the overall mix of innovation -funding forms. For example,
NIH tends to emphasize direct subsidy grant funding, whereas
defense R&D relies more on procurement. 8 7 Accordingly, relative
increases in R&D funding to NIH, rather
than to defense, will tend to
8
emphasize grants over procurement.

86.
NAS PATTERNS, supra note 2, at 10.
87.
See, e.g., supra note 83 and accompanying text; Figure 9, infra.
88.
Cf., e.g., Toole & Kuchler, supra note 21, at 12-15, 22 (comparing USDA funding
with NIH funding, identifying "major shifts" in underlying funding mechanisms).
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The form of funding is further determined by who actually
performs the research with federal expenditures. As indicated in
Figure 6, the largest percentage of federal R&D funding historically
has gone to industry, although this has varied over time. Recently,
the second largest share of federal R&D expenditures has been
These
directed to universities, followed by intramural research.
changes may reflect, in part, the shift towards increasing procurement
from defense R&D and to increasing health grant spending to
Nevertheless,
universities (and possibly to industry) from NIH.
intramural spending also has been increasing slightly, as has
spending at FFRDCs, which are public-private partnerships
concentrated in the energy sector and, to a lesser extent, the defense
sector.

Function,
AAAS
R&D
by
in
Non-Defense
89.
Trends
http://www.aaas.org/page/historical-trends-federal-rd [http://perma.cc/B6ZW-R236].

(2014),
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Figure 6.90

Federal R&D and R&D Plant Funding By
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The shift to greater overall reliance on private industry and
university sources to fund R&D further affects the choice between
government funding forms and government reliance on market-based
approaches. As indicated in Figure 7, businesses currently provide
the majority of the funding for R&D activity in the United States and
perform a slightly larger share of the activity.
In contrast,
universities perform a disproportionately large share compared to
their contribution to funding, which largely reflects federal grant,
contract, and cooperative agreement funding.
Nevertheless, the
relative contributions and activities are in constant flux as
federal-innovation policy is continuously revised, without apparent
coherence, as demonstrated, for example, in Figure 8.

90.
Federal R&D and R&D Plant Funding by Performer, 1967-2014, AAAS (2014),
http://www.aaas.org/pagefhistorical-trends-federal-rd [http://perma.ccBJS9-G6XW].
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Figure 8.92
Estimated Distribution of U.S. R&D Funds in 2012
Millions of Current U.S. Dollars (Percent Change from 2011)
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Unlike many other federal agencies, NIH also routinely collects
and reports R&D expenditure data by the form of the funding
mechanism, which provides more direct insights into these choices. As
indicated in Figure 9, NIH's overall expenditures on R&D have been
relatively stable after significant increases in the late 1990s and early
NAS PATTERNS, supra note 2, at 10.
NAS PATTERNS, supra note 2, at 33.
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2000s. The data show a slight decrease since 2002 in NIH reliance on
grants (direct subsidies), which comprised about half the total NIH
R&D budget.
Since about 2002, intramural research has been
growing very slightly, and R&D contracts and research centers have
reflected only minor variations. It is possible that these emphases will
change further as a result of the efforts of Thomas Kalil within the
Obama Administration 93 to increase funding for advance commitment
purchase contracts, which function like prizes to stimulate greater
healthcare innovation. 94

Figure
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In contrast to these changes in overall expenditure levels, at

the retail level of political engagement, the power and influence of
business firms, individuals, and nonprofit organizations may
dramatically affect how agencies make their funding decisions.
Various institutional factors may affect how resistant bureaucracies

Thomas Kalil has been the Deputy Director for Policy for the White House Office of
93.
Science and Technology Policy and Senior Advisor for Science, Technology and Innovation for the
Economic
Council.
See
Thomas
Kalil,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV,
National
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/author/thomas -kalil [https://perma.cc/P6E8-YFJK].
See, e.g., Michael Kremer & Heidi Williams, Incentivizing Innovation: Adding to the
94.
Tool Kit, in 10 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 1, 1-14 (2010); Thomas Kalil, Prizes for
Technological Innovation, Brookings Institution Discussion Paper 2006-08 (2006),
612kalil.pdf
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/researchliles/papers/2006/12/healthcare-kali/200
[http://perma.cc/6XP3-UDRE].
Funding
Mechanism,
1998-2015
(2014),
95.
AAAS,
NIH
Budget
by
http://www. aaas.org/page/historical-trends-federal-rd [http://perma.cc/E8PZ-AF36].
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are to overt political pressures, including defunding threats from the
legislature. 9 6 There exists an extensive literature on agency capture,
agency structure, and political responsiveness of agencies, which does
not warrant repeating here. 97 The point is that political power and
influence matter to how agencies make their retail decisions to fund
innovation once the overall level of expenditures is set.
Incumbent firms are more likely than upstart rivals to be able
to influence political processes to advance their interests through
Incumbents can thereby resist
agency decision making. 98
Shumpeterian creative destruction 99 by using their political influence
to create regulatory and political barriers both to agencies adopting
new approaches and to new entrants taking advantage of existing
opportunities to tap the limited supply of innovation funds.
[Innovation always has costs and opponents among those who are to bear them. The
success of the opponents relates very little to the outcome of a disinterested cost-benefit
analysis of any given innovation, something that advocates of a science of science policy
might favor, and much more to their ability to punch back politically. 100

The ability of incumbent firms and other powerful constituencies to
conscript political regulatory processes to further political goals adds
to the complexity of the "market regulation" category of
innovation-funding choice and causes further departures from
innovation theory (as addressed in the next Section).
Of course, we cannot get away from politics. But we need to
take the politics of innovation-funding policy seriously if we are to
One
improve our actual innovation-funding decision making.
suggestion for doing so, by requiring greater transparency in and
justification of decision making, is discussed in Part V.

96.
See, e.g., Gregory N. Mandel, The Public Perceptionof Intellectual Property,66 FLA.
L. REV. 261, 304-05 (2014) ("[P]ublic perceptions may influence the law, both through popular
political pressure and through lawmakers' personal perceptions.").
97.
Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHICAGO
KENT L. REV. 1039 (1997). See generally, e.g., Gary Becker, A Theory of Competition among
Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983); Ernesto Dal B6, Regulatory
Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL. 203 (2006); Thomas Jean-Jacques Laffont &
Jean Tirole, The Politics of Government Decision-Making:A Theory of Regulatory Capture, 106 Q.
J. ECON. 1089 (1991); George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971). For a good short discussion of agency capture and related issues (such as
legislative, judicial, and information capture) in the innovation context, see Benjamin & Rai,
supra note 17, at 33-56.
98.
See generally JEFFREY T. MACHER & JOHN W. MAYO, FIRM SIZE AND GOVERNMENTAL
POLICYMAKING INFLUENCE 1-4, http://www.mccombs.utexas.edulDepartmentslBGS/-/media/
CDA53ADBB8194429BE98BF5301D69BF6.ashx [http://perma.cc/2446-ZYZS].
99.

See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, supra note 72, 83-84.

100.

Sapolsky & Taylor, supra note 77, at 31-32.
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B. Regulation
Various forms of regulation-including product and process

regulation, information regulation, and market regulation (which
includes

price

regulation,

regulation,

antitrust

and

intellectual

property law doctrines)-are also methods of affecting business
investment in R&D and thus of funding innovation. 10 1 As with politics
more broadly, regulation is affected by political influence due to the
incentive structure of politicians. 10 2 But regulation also has its own
principles regarding efforts to scientifically manage social risks,
opportunities, benefits, and costs. Thus,
[tihe politicization of science has a fourth front[-]what is often called regulatory
science, the effort to ensure the safety and efficacy of products.... [RIegulation is a
and partially the result of legal
large research effort that is partially
10 3 mandated
prudence to avoid product safety suits.

Government can pervasively regulate markets in ways that
affect not only market entry, but also any returns on investment from

developing marketable products. The extent to which the legal rules
permit or restrict liability can preclude market entry by making
products or services obviously unprofitable. Market regulation and
liability may limit entry as much as prior regulatory approvals that
may be needed to permit the marketing of certain products or

high-risk activities. 10 4
anticipated

forms

of

The perceived rewards to be obtained from
market

regulation,

moreover,

affect

the

innovation targets of firms making decisions regarding innovation
investments. 10 5 The simplest example is the obviousness standard of

patent law, which, if made more stringent, induces investment 10in6

developing more (rather than less) nonobvious (creative) inventions.
It is by now well recognized that product and process
regulation not only may sometimes stimulate innovation, but also may

lower

costs

and

thereby

increase

industrial

and international

competitiveness. Contrary to the belief that environmental regulation
See Sarnoff, supra note 13, at 1142-53.
101.
See, e.g., Sam Peltzman, The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of
102.
Deregulation, BROOKINGS PAPERS: MICROECONOMICS 6-7 (1989) (discussing the motivations of
politicians as principally based on votes and money, citing Stigler, supra note 1).
Sapolsky & Taylor, supra note 77, at 44-45.
103.
See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012) (drugs); 21 U.S.C. § 360(e) (2012) (medical
104.
devices).
See, e.g., Dirk Czarnitski & Andrew A. Toole, Patent Protection,Market Uncertainty,
105.
and R&D Investment, 93 REV. ECON. & STAT. 147, 147-48 (2011) (discussing patents as options
to manage market and regulatory uncertainties). See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, Lecture,
Economic Foundationsof Intellectual Property Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 1693, 1722 (2008).
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012); KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398
106.
(2007); John Barton, Non-Obviousness, 43 IDEA 475, 492 (2003).
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made businesses less competitive,
[Michael] Porter's hypothesis [wa]s that firms which respond to stringent regulation by
developing new technologies have a "first mover" advantage and can capture the market
for their products/services.
Comparison of national competitiveness with good
environmental governance and private-sector responsiveness supports the Porter
hypothesis. Good economic management and good environmental management are
related, and firms which succeed in developing innovative responses to environmental
challenges benefit both environmentally and economically. 107

Nevertheless, such effects are contested and may be highly sensitive
to institutional context. Efforts to provide empirical support to prove
or disprove the Porter hypothesis have shown varying results, noting
the dependency on the underlying regulatory structure.' 08 Regulation
thus not only is affected by politics, but may have context-specific and
uncertain effects:
It is clear from both the original Porter writings and empirical evidence to date that
both innovation and competitiveness outcomes depend significantly on the context. The
[Porter hypothesis] itself was premised on flexible, market-based regulation-not rigid
command-and-control regulation. Beyond environmental regulations, other government
policies can interact
with the link between environmental regulation and innovation or
09
competitiveness. 1

Further, the timing of regulatory efforts, as well as the
timeframe for evaluating their innovation and productivity effects,
may matter dramatically. For example, a recent study has shown that
the observed negative productivity gains from regulation may change
to
positive
gains
when considering
longer timeframes. 10
Consideration of timing only adds to the uncertain innovation effects
of regulation:
Time scales are important, as are the ways in which changes to the various framework
conditions can interact with one another. A regulation forbidding certain types of
research, and product development, may, for example, result in the products, and the
social value, being produced elsewhere .... It is not surprising that feedback loops in
the system give rise to nonlinearities
that make policy intervention less than intuitive,
111
at least to a systems theorist.

107.
Nicholas A. Ashford & Ralph P. Hall, Regulation Induced Innovation for
Sustainable Development, 37 SPG-ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 21, 21 (2012). See generally Michael
E. Porter, America's Green Strategy, 264 SCI. AM. 168 (1991); Michael E. Porter & Claes van der
Linde, Toward a New Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relaitonship, 9 J. ECON.
PERSP. 97 (1995); Michael E. Porter & Claes van der Linde, Green and Competitive, HARv. Bus.
REV. 120 (1995); Stefan Ambec et al., The Porter Hypothesis at 20: Can Environmental
Regulation Enhance Innovation and Competitiveness?, RFF-DP-1101 (Resources for the Future
Jan.
2011),
http://www.rff.org/files/sharepointWorkImages/Download/RFF-DP-11-0l.pdf
[http://perma.cc/KTY5-9R5D].
108.
See Ambec, et al., supra note 105, at 6-10.
109.
Id. at 10.
110.
See id. at 9 (citing P. Lanoie, M. Patry & R. Lajeunesse, Environmental Regulation
and Productivity: New Findings on the PorterHypothesis, 30 J. PRODUCTIVITY ANAL. 121 (2008)).
111.
Gault, supra note 42, at 160-61.
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The global consequences of regulation also are uncertain, as is
discussed in the next Section.
Of course, it is rare that regulatory or other agency-based
112
programs are designed specifically with innovation impacts in mind.
Scholarly analysis of regulation also tends to avoid focusing on
innovation impacts. 113 When it does, the conclusion is evident that
politics, not deliberative innovation policy, largely drives regulatory
programs. 114 As Professors Benjamin and Rai have noted, at least two
"pathologies" keep innovation concerns off the regulatory agenda:
"first, the tendency of political actors to focus on short-term goals and
consequences; and second, their reluctance to threaten the existing
Even where
business models of powerful incumbent actors." 1 5
policies,
they often
regulatory
in
their
innovation
consider
agencies
adopt confused and conflicting, or even contradictory, approaches. 116
In sum, the degree to which private firms can be induced to
develop particular innovation targets, or innovations generally, is
inherently affected by pervasive regulation of the market for those
innovations, the returns that can be achieved, and the liabilities that
Thus, any desired choice of innovation-funding
will attach.
mechanism cannot start with a "clean slate," but must consider the
existing regulatory practices that would affect the innovations at issue
and thus the choices that should be made. Put differently, it is
unclear whether and when we can treat regulatory structures as a
given or as malleable and thus part of the decisions that can be made
Conversely,
when choosing the innovation-funding mechanism.
comparing government innovation-funding choices that rely on
inducing market-based research to alternatives that do not must take
into account the current regulatory structure. In turn, the current
regulatory structure must consider innovation effects when assessing

112.
Cf. W. Nicholson Price II, Making Do in Making Drugs: Innovation Policy and
PharmaceuticalManufacturing, 55 B.C. L. REV. 491, 495 (2014) ("Rather than enhancing and
fine-tuning innovation incentives, FDA [Food and Drug Administration] regulations obstruct
manufacturing innovation by raising significant barriers to innovative change, both before and
after drug approval.").
See, e.g., Benjamin & Rai, supra note 17, at 3 ("And the more general literature on
113.
regulatory reform, while addressing in-depth such questions as capture and cost-benefit analysis,
has tended to ignore the central role of innovation in addressing the majority of regulatory
challenges.").
See, e.g., Gault, supra note 42, at 156-68; Fred Block & Matthew R. Keller, Where
114.
Do Innovations Come From? Transformations in

the U.S. National Innovation System,

1970-2006, at 2 (The Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, July 2008),
http:/www.itif.org/files/Where-doinnovations-come from.pdf [http://perma.cc/B3E4-2SNN.
Benjamin & Rai, supra note 17, at 3.
115.
116.
See id. at 3, 5.
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cost-effectiveness and timing of compliance goals. 117 Throughout the
interactions of market regulation and innovation policy, moreover,
political considerations tend to govern actual decision making.
C. Globalization
Globalization affects both the mechanisms used to generate
innovation and the flows of the innovation and technologies that are
generated. 118 As a general matter, the amount of government funding

of innovation varies by country, and the effects of the funding may
depend on the extent to which the funded research outputs are public
goods with international spillovers.
As Adam Jaffe noted in
discussing trends in defense, non-defense, and academic research in
1996:
To the extent that academic R&D comes closer to being a "pure" public good than
private research, however, then the view that it is the total and not the ratio that counts
may apply. If so, [expenditures by percentage of GDP] is irrelevant, and what matters
is that we spend far more on academic research than any other country.... Of course, if
academic research is a pure public good, then it is not clear why it matters which
country does it; we can all benefit. Hence the relevant questions are how far-in
geographic, technological and institutional space-can R&D be spread. 1 19

Whereas the United States was once the clear leader in

technological innovation, globalization challenges many aspects of its
former dominance. As a recent NAS report recognized:
Globalization is diminishing what once were overwhelming American advantages as the
prime location for creating, commercializing, and industrializing technology. Basic
research and world-class engineering talent now are highly dispersed around the world,
especially in important fields such as nanotechnology, computer science, and renewable
energies.120

As a result of these global changes, governments (including that of the
United States) increasingly will need to leverage external technologies
and brainpower and to open innovation processes in both the private
1 21
and public sectors to cross-border collaborations.

117.
See id. at 25-32 (discussing the role of the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs in performing cost-benefit analysis of regulations).
118.
See, e.g., Kyriakos Drivas et al., Mobility of Knowledge and Local Innovation
Activity
1-3 (2014), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-faculty/searlecenter/events/
roundtable/documents/Drivas_GEO 12_02_2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/F7M8-UDLTI (discussing
and citing studies of knowledge and technology flows that focus on patent citations, market
mechanisms including trade flows, intellectual property acquisitions, and mobility of skilled
labor).
119.
Jaffe, supra note 4, at 12622.
120.
RISING TO THE CHALLENGE, supra note 74, at 61.
121.
See id. at 123; DIPLOMACY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: EMBEDDING A CULTURE OF
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY THROUGHOUT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1 (National Academies of
Science 2015), http:/www.nap.educatalog/21730/diplomacy-for-the-2 1st-century-embedding-a-
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Globalization extends geographically and further complicates
Nations and
the aforementioned regulatory considerations.
businesses need not coordinate and may compete in the innovation

One
game in regulatory jurisdictions that they do not control.
globalized form of governmental funding choice is intergovernmental
collaboration, and national governments often determine their
innovation-funding targets and corresponding funding form by
reference to perceived comparative trade advantages. 122 Globalized

forms of collaboration among firms for research and production, the
pooling and migration of skilled labor from different jurisdictions, and
the formation of public, private, and public-private commons add to

the issues that must be considered when determining innovation
funding. Thus,
[Globalization... has... increased policy choices by fragmenting production processes
(aka the supply-chain or value-chain) into dozens of pieces for any given industry or
even a product line. . . . Therefore governments must alter their traditional top-down
approach toward S&T and instead coordinate with other S&T relevant actors to
customize policy with an eye towards selecting which kinds of activities their firms will
compete on, not which industries. . . . Globalization is changing the role of government
in science and technology, and is increasing, not diminishing or constraining its choices.
not just
... [Tihe state must foster national capacities in financial and human capital,
12 3
in S&T but also among the technocrats who devise and implement policy.

In extending regulatory and other considerations, globalization also
expands the political concerns raised above, as decisions to enter into
particular funding arrangements require coordination, negotiation, or
competition. But to effectively promote globalization of innovation,
networks may require revisions to existing international treaties
governing trade. 124

For
Globalization, moreover, affects countries differently.
example, developing countries with fiscal constraints and less
developed market structures may need to rely less on direct
government subsidization of research and more on technology transfer
to import technologies that can lead to innovative products and

services in local markets. Not all governments

culture-of-science [http://perma.cc/C9TY-NFJE] ("[Ilnternational cooperation based on S&T is
rapidly becoming a key dimension of foreign policies of a number of nations.").
122.
See Sarnoff, supra note 13, at 1112, 1136-42.
Sapolsky & Taylor, supranote 77, at 46-47.
123.
See, e.g., Kieth Maskus & Kamal Saggi, Global Innovation Networks and Their
124.
Implications for the Multilateral Trading System, THE E15 INITIATIVE: STRENGTHENING THE
GLOBAL TRADE SYSTEM 1-7 (Int'l Center for Trade & Sustainable Development and World
Economic Forum, eds., Dec. 2013), http://el5initiative.org/publications/global-innovation[http://perma.cc/8YBNnetworks- and-their- implications -for-the- multilateral-trading-system/
ETHT].
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have the same latitude as those in developed countries to hand out R&D tax credits,
subsidies, or government procurement contracts[; thus] firms in these countries largely
rely on themselves to build up a stock of technological knowledge. Instead of investing
in R&D, to a large extent these firms try to reap the benefits of catching up through
adoption and international technology transfer. Among the various possible channels
for transfer are imports of capital goods, subcontracting agreements, technical
assistance programmes, technology licensing contracts, international standards
certification, and inward foreign direct investment.
In the context of such innovation processes, and considering that most of the firms in
developing countries are small, without patents, and with little experience in
intellectual property protection, these firms should favour tax incentives over direct
R&D support in the form of grants or R&D subsidies. It gives them immediate funds to
innovate and invest without having to write grant applications that would partially leak
their innovative ideas. Moreover, given the small size of these firms' R&D budgets, the
presence of deadweight loss
R&D tax incentives policy does not suffer from the
125
(financing R&D that would have taken place anyway).

Globalization has already strained not only government efforts
to develop human capital, but also the managerial competencies of
both government bureaucrats and firm decision makers. 126 Effective
management of complex inputs and networks requires information
that is rarely available, predictive judgments that are fallible, and
skill sets that are in short supply.
The solution of the increasing numbers of "wicked problems," which cannot be solved by
standard solutions or by spending more money, calls for innovative solutions....
[A]nother source of public innovation... [is] the role of multi-actor collaboration in
spurring innovation relating to public policies, organizations and services....
However... many things can go wrong in the contingent process of networking,
collaboration and innovation and the precarious links between them. As such, some
kind of innovation management is required in order to remove barriers, enhance drivers
and keep the process of collaborative innovation on track. 127

The problem of policy analysis is, of course, compounded by the
difficulty of tracking innovation inputs and outputs, including
125.
Micheline Goedhuys, Hugo Hollanders & Pierre Mohnen, Innovation Policies for
Development, THE GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2015: EFFECTIVE INNOVATION POLICIES FOR
DEVELOPMENT 84 (Soumitra Dutta, Bruno Lanvin, & Sacha Wunsch-Vincent eds., Cornell
University, INSEAD, & WIPO 2015).
See, e.g., RISING TO THE CHALLENGE, supra note 74, at 118-21 (discussing the need
126.
for human capital); Phillip Brown, Hugh Lauder, David Ashton, Education, Globalization and
131, 140 (2008),
the Future of the Knowledge Economy, 7(2) EuR. EDUC. RES. J.
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/19085/1[Brown%2OLauder.pdf [http://perma.cc/WMH2-UXBQ] ("[V]irtually all
[managers] we spoke to in China, Korea, India and Singapore, as well as the United States,
Germany and Britain, believed that they were in a war for talent, which was increasingly
global."). See generally Deborah Agostino et al., Developing a Performance Measurement System
for Public Research Centers, 7 INT. J. OF BUS. SCI. & APPLIED MGMT. 43, 44-45 (2012) (discussing
development of key performance indicators for performance management systems that balance
the information needs of different stakeholders).
Jacob Torfing, Collaborative Innovation in the Public Sector, HANDBOOK OF
127.
INNOVATION IN PUBLIC SERVICES, supra note 73, at 301; see Kirsty Strokosch, Co-Productionand
Innovation in Public Services: Can Co-Production Drive Innovation, in HANDBOOK OF
INNOVATION IN PUBLIC SERVICES, supra note 73, at 376-79.
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technology transfer across countries, given the relative paucity of data
128
sources on the measures that one would want to know about.
Systems of innovation not only exist at sub-national, national,
pan-regional, and international levels, but also "increasingly interact,
129
further complicat[ing] the task of analysing innovation systems."'

International standard- setting and treaty-making processes
can partially reduce some of the complexities of globalization. But
they may do so only by globalizing the political capture concerns

discussed earlier, given the comparative ability of incumbent firms
and of powerful countries to dominate such processes.

Obviously,

there are North-South and other divides in regard to which countries
will benefit from adoption of various technologies, regulatory
measures, and (more directly) obligations to engage in wealth
transfers.' 30 These political tensions may preclude development of
international policies on measures that would, for example, directly
control market prices and otherwise affect economic returns to

innovation (although countries will maintain the regulatory authority
13 1
to do so in ways that may generate further global tensions).

Global

R&D expenditures

and,

consequently,

innovation,

moreover, is highly concentrated in a few countries. Close to three
quarters of global expenditures are undertaken by only seven

128.

See, e.g., Diego A. Comin & Marti Mestiari, Technology Diffusion: Measurement,

Causes and Consequences, (NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH Working Paper No. 19052, 2013)

('Traditional diffusion measures have two important drawbacks. First, their computation
requires the use micro-level data sets which are hard to assemble. The limits imposed by this
requirement may explain why, after 50 years of research, we still lack comprehensive data sets
that cover the diffusion of many technologies, in many countries over protracted periods. Second,
traditional diffusion measures do not capture the intensity with which each adopter uses the
technology.").
129.

NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION &

DEVELOPMENT 43 (1997), http://www.oecd.org/science/inno/2101733.pdf [http://perma.ccAHA5ZDZA].
130.
See, e.g., UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), art. 4.5, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107, signed June 1992, entered into force March 21, 1994 ('The developed country
Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II shall take all practicable steps to
promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally
sound technologies and know-how to other Parties, particularly developing country Parties, to
enable them to implement the provisions of the Convention."). See generally Dalindyebo
Shabalala, Technology Transfer for Climate Change and Developing Country Viewpoints on
Historical Responsibility and Common but Differentiated Responsibilities, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CLIMATE CHANGE (Joshua D. Sarnoff ed., Edward

Elgar forthcoming 2016).
131.
See Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Patent System and Climate Change, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH.
301, 333-59 (2011) (discussing six measures that countries could adopt to promote innovation in
regard to patented climate change technologies that would be less politically charged than
wholesale exclusion of green technologies from the patent system or direct price or competition
regulation or compulsory licensing to assure reasonable-cost access to such technologies).
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countries. 132 Thus, global decisions on research targets and methods
are made principally by only a few countries, which may limit their
focus to the needs of those countries 133 and may exacerbate the
political capture concerns just discussed. Politics also will determine
the extent to which potential donor countries will fulfill international
treaty obligations or meet global needs to dictate innovation targets
134
and funding choices.
D. Institutions,Networks, and Power
Yet another aspect of the politics of innovation-funding choices
is existing institutions and the people that comprise them, the
networks in which these institutions are located, and the power
arrangements that the institutions reflect. 135 The various institutions

132.
See Mark Baroush, U.S. R&D Resumes Growth in 2011 and 2012, Ahead of the Pace
of the Gross Domestic Product, Nat'l. Center for Sci. & Eng'g. Stat. Info Brief, NSF 14-307, 7
(Dec. 2013), http://www.nsf.govlstatistics/inflbrief/nsf14307/[http://perma.cc/5VLG-K4NU].
133.

See, e.g., MARY MORAN, GLOBAL FUNDING OF NEW PRODUCTS FOR NEGLECTED

2011),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
(Nat'l.
Acad.
Press
DISEASES
1
TROPICAL
booksJNBK62528/?report=reader#!po=2.63158 [http:/lperma.cc/FUN3-D7C3] ('The [global] level
of investment into research and development of new products for [Neglected Tropical Diseases]
NTDs . . . shows that few NTD areas receive anywhere near the level of funding required; and
that funding, when it is available, is rarely allocated in a manner likely to move products
through the pipeline to patients.").
See, e.g., UNFCCC, supra note 123, at art. 4.5; Manica Balasegaram, et al., A Global
134.
Biomedical R&D Fund and Mechanism for Innovations of Public Health Importance, 12 PLOS
2015),
http://www.msfaccess.org/sites/default/files/
15,
MEDICAL
(May
('WHO
[http://perma.cc/XKW7-67LP]
Innov_%20PLOSGlobalBiomedicalR&Dfund-2015.pdf
[World Health Organization] member states have recently indicated support for establishing a
fund with a voluntary financing model that would finance biomedical R&D based on . . . delinkage of the delivery price from R&D costs, the use of open knowledge innovation, and
licensing for access. Such principles would allow for lower cost and more efficient R&D centered
on the needs and resources of the people who need them most."); Bangladesh, Barbados, Bolivia
& Suriname, Proposal for WHO Discussions on a Biomedical R&D Treaty, WHO (Apr. 9, 2015),
http://www.who.int/philBangladeshBarbadosBoliviaSuriname-RDTreaty.pdf
[http://perma.ccV5L7-G7G3] ('The challenge currently facing the [Expert Working Group] and
WHO Member States lies in identifying areas where global cooperation and global norm setting
are both useful and feasible."); Ryan Abbott, PotentialElements of the WHO Global R&D Treaty:
Tailoring Solutions for DisparateContexts, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.ipwatch.org/2013/01/29/potential-elements-of-the-who-global-rd-treaty-tailoring-solutions-fordisparate-contexts/ [http://perma.cc/PF9S-ZX7Q] ("[O]btaining funding commitments from
Member States will be quite a challenge.").
135.
The Author uses the terms "institutions," "networks," and "power" in their
commonly understood meanings and not using more precise (and somewhat different) meanings
that may be applied by sociologists. See, e.g., Walter W. Powell, Jason Owen-Smith & Laurel
Smith-Doerr, Sociology and the Science of Science Policy, THE HANDBOOK OF THE SCIENCE OF
SCIENCE POLICY, supra note 2, at 56-57 (defining "institutions" as "the formal and informal rules
and conventions that guide a great deal of social life," "networks" as "patterned relationships
that connect both individual and organizational participants in a field," and "power relations" as
"particular, asymmetric forms of network ties").
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and people may sometimes seek to achieve different innovation goals,
rendering particular innovation choices suboptimal or ineffective.
Conversely, the institutions may align in ways that cause particular
forms of innovation funding to be better choices than forms that might
otherwise be considered a preferable alternative.
People-not institutions-make decisions, and people in
government funding institutions make decisions about which other
people to fund, the funding form, and the extent of funding based on
many "political" factors beyond those discussed above. Such factors
may include personal affinity, reputation, status within organizations,
and a variety of other characteristics that are not easy to measure or
model. 136 Conversely, the ability of funding recipients to achieve
innovations will depend significantly on their connection to networks
of information and other resources, which are often controlled by other
The networks and status of
people in different institutions. 137
potential funding recipients (which may be global and highly
fragmented) are sometimes used as proxies by funding institutions to
evaluate the comparative ability to achieve innovation outputs, given
38
the difficulties of direct measurement of innovation ability.'
Networks and power relations embedded in social practices
often resist external efforts at control or changed direction, and those
efforts may thereby result in unintended consequences. 1 39 Further,
the missions of institutions may reflect "policy mandates," "policy
Policy mandates are general
restrictions," and "conundrums."'140
directions that institutions are supposed to follow. Policy restrictions
are specific prohibitions on adopting certain policies. Conundrums
occur where different institutions may collectively be insufficient to
achieve goals or may impose conflicting mandates or restrictions.
Conundrums are particularly likely to occur when the institutions
have limited jurisdictional competence, but their actions affect other
jurisdictions. 141
The influence of institutions, networks, and power are rarely

136.

See, e.g., William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias ia Decision

Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 38 (1988), http://hks.harvard.edu/fs/rzeckhau/status

quo

bias.pdf [http:lperma.cc/398D-7225] ('Many choices are made within group and organizational
settings, where individuals' interests do not fully coincide. A decision maker may opt to retain a
previous choice to maintain his or her reputation and decision-making authority. To reverse his
or her position might suggest that he or she had made a poor choice originally.").
137.

See generally R. S. BURT,

STRUCTURAL HOLES:

THE

SOCIAL STRUCTURE

COMPETITION (Harvard Univ. Press 1992).
See, e.g., Powell, Owen-Smith & Smith-Doerr, supra note 133, at 56.
138.
See id. at 57.
139.
140.

Id. at 58.

141.

See id.
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subject to conscious decision-making controls and operate more subtly
and in ways that raise other social policy concerns. For example,
these influences raise particular concerns for the distribution of the
benefits of innovation funding choices:
[SIcience policy is an effort to alter the trajectory, workings, and content of the social
system of science with the relatively weak lever of control over some, largely formal,
[Tihe recent push toward interdisciplinary research centers
aspects of institutions ....
in U.S. colleges and universities represents an indissoluble mix of all three-policy
mandates, restrictions, and conundrums [where competing jurisdictional policies have
[T]he institutional, network, and power
limited effect or work at cross-purposes].
mechanisms at work ... have wider implications for legitimacy claims, labor market
processes, industrial clustering, and race/gender inequalities that span many fields of
science. 142

These institutional, network, and power effects thus may
exacerbate existing disparities of innovative activity, wealth, and
power globally in ways that generate additional global domestic
In particular, they may raise significant
political tensions.
distributive justice concerns that already may justify choosing
143
nonmarket approaches to innovation funding.
E. Economics and Psychology
There is an extensive and developing literature regarding
motivations to generate different kinds of innovations and the
acquisition of specific forms of intellectual property. First, these
considerations include intrinsic motivations, which encompass
personal satisfaction such as a sense of accomplishment as well as
various forms of altruism. Next, extrinsic motivations also exist, and
they encompass financial and reputational rewards. 144 Much of
intellectual property policy depends on judging these motivations
correctly so as to adopt doctrines that will induce initial innovation
both without imposing on society the excessive static costs of acquiring
Id. at 57-58.
142.
143.
See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond
Intellectual Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 996-97 (2012) (noting that intellectual
property rations access according to price, whereas "the background allocation of resources may
be unjust" and arguing that it is debatable that efficiency goals should be prioritized over
distributive justice, but in any event it has not been shown that intellectual property approaches
and reliance on price is a more efficient innovation strategy).
144.
See, e.g., Sarnoff, supra note 13, at 1095-98 (citing, inter alia, LAWRENCE LESSIG,
REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY (2008); Eric Von Hippel,
DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION (2005); Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process:
Intellectual Property Law and the Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999, 200204 (2011); Jessica Silbey, Comparative Tales of Originsand Access: Intellectual Property and the
Rhetoric of Social Change, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 195, 201 (2010); Rebecca Tushnet, Naming
Rights: Attribution and Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 789, 794-98. See generally Peter Lee, Social
Innovation, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 21 (2014).

2016] MISMATCH BETWEEN R&D FUNDING AND INNOVATION

401

innovation-produced goods and without imposing excessive dynamic
costs on sequential innovation. 145 What is less well known is that
these intrinsic and extrinsic motivations operate over long timeframes
and across a wide range of human and other capital inputs to
innovation; therefore, they may frequently be in competition
146
with-rather than supplement-each other.
Economic incentives influence the career choice of students with respect to
science/engineering and the decisions of firms to fund and commercialize research.
Individuals, firms, and the government interact in a dynamic process ....Economists
rarely question the idea that people respond to pecuniary interests but there is a social
psychology literature that warns that paying people to undertake certain actions can
backfire by replacing or killing intrinsic motivation, which lead them to do less of that
activity. Choosing a career is not one of those activities.... Considerable policy
discourse also revolves around normative appeals for young people to choose science
over other careers .... Whatever the actual needs of the economy ... the lesson from

persons in scientific disciplines, it has
economics is that if the country wants14additional
7
to "put its money where its mouth is."

Normative appeals to develop particular social preferences may
be highly cost-effective strategies to induce desired behavioral
responses, but they also may encounter resistance. 148 It is notoriously
difficult to alter or to effectively cater to the motivations of individuals
as well as those of groups. 14 9 Further, blatant normative appeals may
appear paternalistic and hopelessly out of touch. Financial incentives
may appear too little or too great to induce particular actions,
particularly when the recipients may not perceive the availability of
145.
See, e.g., Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property Law, in 2
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 72 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
146.
See, e.g., Eric E. Johnson, The Economics and Sociality of Sharing Intellectual
Property Rights, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1935, 1958 (2014) (discussing how gratitude and social
valuation operate as more effective encouragements for transfers of intellectual property than
markets and pricing); Emily Marden & R. Nelson Godfrey, Intellectual Property and Sharing
Regimes in Agricultural Genomics: Finding the Right Balance for Innovation, 17 DRAKE J. AGRIC.
L. 369, 372-73 (2012) (noting the complex and unsettled balance of national and international
intellectual property and sharing regimes in this field); Liza S. Vertinsky, Making Room for
Cooperative Innovation, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067, 1069-71 (2014) (discussing how patent
rights based on extrinsic motivations-may interfere with non-market mechanisms-based on
intrinsic motivations-that underlie cooperative innovation).
Freeman, supra note 82, at 85, 87-88.
147.
See, e.g., Kenki Adachi, Countering Norm Creation: Tug-of-War Between Norm
148.
Entrepreneursand Norm Protectorson Access to Essential Medicines, 26 RITSUMEIKAN BULL. 1,
2-7 (2013). See generally Emmanuel Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual
Property Systems: The Case of French Chefs, 19 ORG. SC. 187 (2008); Dotan Oliar & Christopher
Sprigman, There's No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and
the Transformation of Stand- Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787, 1865 (2008); Mans Svensson &
Stefan Larsson, Social Norms and Intellectual Property: Online Norms and the European Legal
Development, 1 SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 1, 45 (2009).

See, e.g., Walter Scott, The Psychology of Advertising, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 1904),
149.
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1904/01/the-psychology-of-advertising/303465/
[http://perma.ccIU2QP-YDWY].
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Overall funding levels also may be
funding levels properly.
insufficient to induce the desired behavioral changes or insufficient to
induce the necessary level of effort over the requisite temporal horizon
needed. For example, physics graduate students may find few funding
opportunities that would induce them to continue to work on complex,
multi-year projects with uncertain outcomes, such as nuclear fusion,
when Wall Street opportunities to "get rich quick" by applying their
150
mathematical skills to trading are available.
Similarly, particular funding levels needed to induce
innovation or achieve goals may not be adequately perceived or
anticipated by firms within the marketplace, as has been noted in the
context of procurement:
To define a future need and turn it into specifications for a concrete tender process, and
then to channel this through the procurement process and back into adoption, require
that the "business owners" within the organisations-that is the budget holders-are
actively engaged both with the internal end user or those responsible to deliver the
service, and the procurers. Secondly, institutional barriers such as decentralised or
"silo" budgets may also hinder the adoption of innovations.... Sound internal
coordination and appropriate interfaces between the organization and the market have
been identified as major success factors for innovation procurement .... 151

Nevertheless, public decisions may seek to affect the public's
demand for innovation directly, thereby inducing changes to the
amount of effort, the level of funding, and the effectiveness of funding
that can be induced.
Whilst debates about the influence of "demand" on innovation are not new, the broad
interest in the use of public demand as a driver of innovation is a significant
development in innovation policy design. For instance, procurement for innovation was
an element of the European Commission's Action Plan to raise R&D expenditures to the
3 percent Barcelona target. Subsequent programmatic European policy papers...
emphasized a need to promote policies driving demand for innovation, including public
procurement. Consequently, the EU Commission set up the European Lead Market
Initiative... [which] focused largely on sectors in which the state is an important
purchaser, and considered public procurement to be one of the key instruments for the
creation of 'lead markets" in Europe .... The promotion of demand-side innovation
policies, including procurement, has also been supported by many [Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)] countries and the OECD itself.152

The question, then, is not only how to get the demand-side
management policies right, but also how to stabilize politics. Early
150.
See, e.g., Roman Czujko & Garrett Anderson, Common Careers of Physicists in the
PHYSICS
1,
15
(2015), https://www.aip.org/sites/
Private Sector, AM. INST.
OF
default/files/statistics/phd-plus-10/PhysPrivSect.pdf [http://perma.cc/SZ3C-YC8K] (archived on
Oct. 28, 2015) ("[A]nalysis of respondents' descriptions of their jobs revealed physicists who were
working in finance described applying high-level mathematics, modeling, and developing
algorithms-concepts learned and practiced in their physics training, to meet the goals of their
employers.").
151.
Edler & Uyarra, supra note 73, at 232.
Id. at 224.
152.
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experience with demand-side management of consumers in the context
53
of electric power usage demonstrated some significant reductions.

But political will (perhaps affected by reductions in market demand
and consequent reductions in producer surplus) ultimately led to
abandonment of those efforts.1 54 These efforts have only recently been

resurrected under the guise of the "smart grid," given the increased
ability to monitor usage.

15

Consistent policies over time are needed,

just as is consistent funding-which this Article addresses next.
F. Stability of Funding Streams

While the overall or particularized levels of innovation funding
affect motivations and responses, the stability of funding streams can
also

affect

how

actors

in

the

innovation

system

respond

to

incentives. 56 Funding surges increase costs of production (including
labor costs as markets adjust) compared to temporally more even

funding.

57

Conversely, the inevitable reductions in funding following

surges result in sunk costs when projects are dislocated or abandoned

(with

153.

attendant

human

costs

in

addition

to

reductions

in

See, e.g., JOSEPH EmO, THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF U.S. UTILITY DEMAND

SIDE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS 4-8 (1996), https://emp.lbl.gov/publications/past-present-andTED
[http://perma.cc/DH6G-QFB2];
future-us-utility-demand-side- management-programs
FLANNIGAN & STAN HEDLEY, ANALYSIS OF SUCCESSFUL DEMAND SIDE MANAGEMENT AT PUBLICLY
http://web.ornl.gov/scilees/etsd/pes/pubs/3445603869133.pdf
1
(1994),
UTILITIES
OWNED
[http://perma.cc/C7AD-7R9Y].
154.
See, e.g., Myron B. Katz, Demand Side Management: Reflections of an frreverent
Regulator, 14 RES. & ENERGY 187 (1992).
Murthy Balijepalli & Khaparde Pradhan, Review of Demand Response under Smart
155.
Grid Paradigm, INST. OF ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS POWER & ENERGY SOCy
INNOVATIVE SMART GRID TECH. CONF., Jan. 2011, at 4; US FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N,
STAFF REPORT, A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE POTENTIAL (2009),

http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/06-09-demand-response.pdf [http://perma.cc/CV4L-GTE2];
US FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMIM'N, STAFF REPORT, ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE AND
ADVANCED METERING (2008), https://www.ferc.gov/legalstaff-reports/12-08-demand-response.pdf
[https://perma.cc/82EZ-VPBY].
See, e.g., Walter D. Valdivia & Benjamin Y. Clark, The Politics of Federal R&D: A
156.
Punctuated EquilibriumAnalysis, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION PAPER (Brookings Institution), June
17, 2015, at 13, http://www.brookings.edu/-/medialresearch/files/papers/2015/O6/L7-politics[http://perma.cc/H85A-WgWZI
federal-research-develop ment-valdivia-clark/r -dpolitics.pdf
("Research, more than other social functions, uses very long time horizons for planning; the
stability and predictability of its budget in the long term is critical for its smooth operation.");
Dominique Guellec & Bruno van Pottlesburghe, The Impact of Public R&D Expenditure on
Business R&D 15 (Nov. 2001) (unpublished working paper), http://www.ulb.ac.be/
[http://perma.cc/W2UC-ASHN]
cours/solvay/vanpottelsberghe/resources/PapEINT 2.pdf)
('R&D is more likely to be stimulated in industries where government funding is more stable.");
Powell et al., supra note 133, at 57.
157.
See, e.g., Cincera, Czarnitsky & Thorwarth, supra note 1, at 16.
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innovation).1 5 8 To avoid these problems, firms may engage in strategic
behaviors that lead to suboptimal innovation output levels, such as
the hoarding of funds intended to spur more rapid activity. 159 They
also may resort to selecting innovation targets that may reflect fewer
financial risks or targets that do not require performance within
specified timeframes.
[Large spending increases are likely to increase the costs and reduce the productivity of
research compared to more gradual increases in spending. Rapid buildups in R&D
produce larger increases in costs than gradual buildups because it takes time for people
and resources to meet the new demand, and because costs tend to rise non-linearly in
the short run. This means less output for the research dollar. The second problem is
that rapid increases must level off, and when they do, this invariably leaves some people
and projects caught in the pipeline ....
[A]gencies, universities, and principal
investigators have sought ways to smooth the spending of funds and buffer the drop off
16 0
in spending when ARRA ends.

Of course, the need to keep funding streams constant returns us
to-wait for it-politics.
There is constant pressure to reduce
spending on R&D, particularly given competing demands on federal
and state budgets and at times of economic decline.' 61 Finally,
political decisions regarding financial regulation will affect how much
and what types of private financing flow to R&D instead of-or in
162
addition to--such public funds.
G. Options and PortfolioApproaches
In part to hedge against the many risks of outcome failures and
innovation-funding reductions, agencies for many years have adopted
complex option or portfolio approaches. Option approaches focus on
partial or temporally segmented funding to see how the results of
163
initial choices develop and to increase or redirect funding over time.
Portfolio approaches focus on simultaneous funding of different

158.
See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 82, at 98-99.
See, e.g., id.
159.
160.
Id.
161.
See, e.g., Emily Chasan, Politics and R&D Don't Mix, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2013),
http:/blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2013/12/03/politics-and-rd-dont-mix/tab/print/
[http://perma.cc/AQ867K9Z] ("Lawmakers play chicken with [the R&D tax credit],' says Brian Gladden, chief financial
officer of computer maker Dell Inc."); BATTELLE, 2014 GLOBAL R&D FUNDING FORECAST 3 (2013),
http://www.battelle.org/docs/tpp/2014-global-rd-funding-forecast.pdf
[http://perma.cc/ZH7HWVE8] ("Innovation is improbable without proper funding, so we project how political
developments and economic conditions around the globe will affect R&D support in 2014.").
162.
See, e.g., Kevin Laws & Zeb Zankel, Funding Innovation: Regulating Seed
Financing,31 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 3-4, 18-22 (2015) (discussing the need to modify
traditional securities law regulation of start-up and other financing in the seed sector, without
adversely affecting existing investor protections).
163.
See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 82, at 96-97.
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Option

and portfolio

strategies

405
thus

include: temporally limited and segmented innovation targets (with
similarly limited and segmented funding); multi-stage reviews and
multiple evaluation metrics; adoption of required milestones as
conditions on payment-such as progress payments-or on continued

funding; and targeting of various kinds of expertise or firms through
adoption of multiple, simultaneous, or sequential funding. 165 These
option and portfolio approaches may reflect complex combinations of

five basic forms of innovation funding discussed earlier. 166 Option and
portfolio approaches thus resemble innovation informed by federalism
theory, under which experimentation across a range of governmental

jurisdictions is thought to promote creative approaches so as to find
167
out what works best.
Option and portfolio approaches also may be adopted by
individual firms that have to finance innovative efforts or decide with

whom they wish to collaborate.
As a firm or principal investigator learns from initial research whether a particular
research path is or is not promising, there is the option of deciding whether or not to
pursue that path further ....This is similar to an option in finance, where the investor
buys the right to buy or sell some item in the future when the investor will Ihave better
knowledge of its value ....Since the value of options rises with variance in potential
returns, the option perspective leads firms and principal investigators to undertake
riskier potentially transformative research than they would otherwise do . . .. Research
and development spending can also be viewed from the perspective of portfolio analysis,
the value of diversification in investing in different assets or projects to
which stresses
16 8
reduce risk.

Adopting these complex option and portfolio approaches not

only reduces potential risks for innovation funders, but also alters the
risk-reward ratio for participants. 169 Accordingly, these approaches
can backfire if the participants' intrinsic and extrinsic motivations are
adversely affected in ways that either eliminate their willingness to
participate (particularly when compared to alternative prospects) or
70
that reduce their effort (defeating the goal of diversifying efforts).1

164.
See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., id.
165.
See Sarnoff, supra note 13, at 1117-23, 1128-53.
166.
See, e.g., Doni Gewirtzman, Complex Experimental Federalism, 63 BUFF. L. REV.
167.
241, 246-48 (2015) (discussing how heterogeneity and interdependence affect experimentation
and its results across sub-jurisdictions). See generally Maryann Feldman & Lauren Lanahan,
State Science Policy Experiments, in THE CHANGING FRONTIER: RETHINKING SCIENCE AND
INNOVATION POLICY (Adam Jaffe and Benjamin Jones, eds., National Bureau of Economic
Research 2015).
Freeman, supra note 82, at 96-97.
168.
See, e.g., id.
169.
See, e.g., Guellec & van Pottelsberghe, supra note 154, at 15, 17 ("Increasing the
170.
direct funding (tax incentives) of business research reduces the stimulating effect of tax
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H. Ideology
Ideology, which includes preferences for reliance on markets or
on government action and public or private funding sources,' 71 often
governs innovation-funding politics. At the wholesale level, ideology
of
government
the
overall
amounts
largely
determines
innovation-funding levels. At the retail level, ideology also largely
determines the degree to which those funds are directed to public
institutions, public-private partnerships, or private innovative
actors-each having different intrinsic and extrinsic motivations.
Ideology also includes preferences for (or aversion to) general taxation
or product-based single-market taxation through intellectual property
rights.172
Ideological differences (or perceptions of them) tend to vary
according to political party (or to a wing of a particular party) and
according to particular agency missions, such as national defense or
economic development. 173 These ideological differences are notable,
although the balance of ideological views between public and private
sources of innovation funding and R&D performers has varied over
74
time.1
Ideological differences on innovation funding thus generally
but inconsistently correlate with (capital "P") political views:
Based on these historical and recent societal trends, Republicans are portrayed as
stingy with their R&D funding and as dogmatic enemies of public science, especially in
controversial realms of biomedical research, climate change, and the environment....
[MIultivariate multiple regression models reveal significant relationships between party
affiliation and R&D funding allocations. Yet the results do not necessarily portray a
straightforward, constant pattern between Democrats and Republicans that
For
corroborates already existing ideological notions about the party platforms.
example, Democratic control of the government prompts increased spending for some
agencies, such as NASA, EPA, DOC, and DOT, while prompting decreased spending in
other agencies, such as NSF, USDA, and NIH. In fact, in terms of overall R&D funding,
Republican presidents appear more eager to spend than their Democratic counterparts.
But this result could be due to Republicans' consistently spending more on defense

incentives (direct government funding) . . . . mhe effectiveness of each of the various policy tools
depends on the use of the others. In particular, government funding of business R&D and tax
incentives are substitutes; greater use of one reduces the effectiveness of the other.").
See, e.g., E. Mariana Mazzucato, It's a Myth That Entrepreneurs Drive New
171.
1,
2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/health-and science/
Technology, SLATE
(Sept.
new scientist/2013/09/entrepreneurs or the state innovationcomes from public investment.ht
ml.
172.
See, e.g., Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 19, at 4-5.
173.
See, e.g., G. Sidita Kushi, Breaking Science Sterotypes: Examining the Effects of
Party Politics on Federal R&D Funding, 7 J. Sd. POL'Y & GOVERNANCE 1, 6-7 (2015),
http://www.sciencepolicyjournal.org/uploads/5/4/3/4/5434385/pa8-kushi-s-manuscript-clean.pdf.
174.
For a short account of major changes to the structure of innovation institutions in
the US from the 1950s to 1980s, see Block & Keller, supra note 114, at 3-6.
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functions, while their Democrat counterparts consistently spend more on smaller
budgetary functions, such as Space, Energy, Natural Resources, and the Environment.
Furthermore, Senate Party Majority stands as the weakest player in terms of party
holds predictive relationships to a few agency
politics influence on R&D funding; it17only
5
budget allocations (NASA and DOI).

Decisions to rely on private funding, intellectual property rights, and
use of markets to develop technologies, moreover, typically are more

likely

to

reflect

deeply

held

ideological

beliefs,

rather

than

particularized, carefully considered analytic and empirical judgments.

In turn, those beliefs are likely to be based on concerns about avoiding
paternalism in regard to recognizing and forming preferences. 1 6
Even when it is recognized that government has a significant

role to play at the wholesale level in funding and promoting
innovation, ideological differences play a large role at the retail level
in determining how much and what kinds of government interventions
in the market are warranted. The ideological view that the market,
rather than government actors, will better direct innovation to public
preferences in the absence of identified market failures exerts a
powerful force in determining the innovation targets that the

175.
Sidita Kushi, Breaking Science Sterotypes: Examining the Effects of PartyPoliticson
(Aug.
2015),
SCI.
POL'Y
&
GOVERNANCE
Funding, 7
J.
Federal R&D
http://www.sciencepolicyjournal.org/uploads/5/4/3/4/5434385/pa8-kushi-s-manuscript-clean.pdf
[http://perma.cc/BRZ7-HL25]; see also, e.g., Allyn K. Milojevich, Interest Groups, Political Party
Control, Lobbying, and Science Funding: A Population Ecology Approach 20 (Dec. 2014)
Tennessee),
University
of
doctoral
dissertation,
(unpublished
http://trace.tennessee.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4367&context=utk-graddiss
[http://perma.cc/L62J-VV3Y] (archived on Oct. 28, 2015) ("Examining the federal budget for
science from 1951 until 2012, I find that federal funding increases when Democrats control
Congress and the presidency, holding even when the funding more closely aligns with traditional
Republican preferences, such as Department of Defense research. The relationship is less clear
when expanded cross-nationally, with leftist control showing nearly negligible effects."). But see
Sam Shapiro, Federal R&D: Analyzing the Shift from Basic and Applied Research Toward
Development 34 (unpublished honors economics thesis, Stanford University) (May 2013),
https:H//economics.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/samshapirohonorsthesismay20l3.pdi) [http://perma.cc/8QU4-K9X7] ("With such drastic ups and downs in both
percentage and gross dollar breakdown of federal development spending, one might reasonably
conclude that the roller-coaster is caused by dueling ideologies taking control in the white house
or congress. Indeed, recent gridlock between Democrats and Republicans in the nation's capital,
with debates centering around the proper role of the government in regulating and supporting
the private sector, have highlighted opposing views about how much to support private sector
R&D. This divide might be even more pronounced when looking at development R&D spending,
which is the type farthest from 'public good' research .... In fact, when looking at the total
amount of federal spending on development, three clear trend lines emerge: from 1974 to 1988
there is consistent, rapid growth in development spending. Next, spending levels off, remaining
relatively constant from 1988 to 2000 before rising rapidly again from 2000 to 2011. However ...
these periods of consistency do not correspond with presidents of a certain party presiding over
the white house or on political party controlling the congress.").
176.
See Sarnoff, supra note 13, at 1101-02.
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government should consciously promote. 177 This view, however, is of
relatively recent vintage:
[Tihe Nelson-Arrow framework [based on beliefs in underinvestment in basic research
by market economies due to risk, limited appropriability, and increasing returns to
use] . . . has become so commonplace in the economic justification for public support of
basic research that it is easy to overlook the intellectual and political transformation
that it represented when first articulated. Historically, from America's founding days,
when colonies offered prizes and premiums for specific technological achievements...
the U.S. government has always supported various forms of mission-oriented R&D ....
[In contrast, far] less agreement exists.., about the application of the market failure
framework to technology policy.... The government failure model as applied to R&D,
briefly stated, is that the public sector tends to 1invest
too much and in the wrong places,
78
as well as to crowd out private sector activities.

In sum, ideological preferences largely determine the scope and
nature of innovation-funding choices, particularly in the absence of
agreed-upon theoretical analyses and empirical information. Ideology
induces decision makers to rely on their innate beliefs rather than to
seek more information or to think carefully about what may work best
in particular situations. Worse yet, ideology may blind decision
makers to actual information that would improve their choices of
innovation-funding forms and recipients, yet conflict with their default
heuristic positions. 179 It is for these reasons that this Article now
turns to suggested reforms.
V. MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INNOVATION
FUNDING

Notwithstanding the eight forms of political deviance from
desired innovation-funding policy discussed above, hope of decision
making that is better informed, more effective, and more efficient

177.
See, e.g., id. at 1100-01 (discussing ideological aversion to having the government
pick "winners and losers.").
178.
Feller, supra note 11, at 142-43.
179.
See, e.g., Leon Festinger, Cognitive Dissonance, 207 SCI. AM. 93, 93 (1962); Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Sci.
1124, 1124-25 (1974); see also Adrian Kuenzler & Douglas A. Kysar, Environmental Law, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 752-55 (2014) (discussing studies

of psychological "distorting influences" that have led to criticism of relying on public risk
perceptions in environmental regulation). See generally Klaus Fiedler & Momme von Sydow,
Heuristics and Biases: Beyond Tversky & Kahneman's (1974) Judgment Under Uncertainty, in
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY: REVISITING THE CLASSICAL STUDIES 146, 155 (M. W. Eysenck & D.

Groome
eds.,
Sage
Press
Los
Angeles
2015),
http://crisp.psi.uniheidelberg.de/sites/default/files/vonSydow/Fiedler__vonSydow_2015_Heuristic and biasesBeyo
ndTversky.Kahneman s_1974_In EysenckGroomeCh_12.pdf
[http://perma.cc/JD7C9QFUI.
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springs eternal.18 0 This Article adds two suggestions for reform of our
political economy of innovation funding to the developing scholarship
on the science of science policy and the science of innovation policy.
These recommendations are: (1) to improve information collection on

R&D funding inputs and outputs in order to inform future innovation
decision making; and (2) to document the reasons for choosing
particular innovation-funding forms in order to increase transparency

when making those choices and to improve the ability to evaluate
retrospectively whether past assumptions were justified and whether
past practices should again be followed.
A.

Collecting More and Better Information on R&D Funding
Innovation Outputs

Although the discussion of deviance above might suggest that
facts do not matter to the innovation-funding decision process, facts
Accordingly, improving the nature and
are "stubborn things."'81
amount of relevant data would help innovation funders assess the
comparative effectiveness of particular institutions in reaching desired
innovation-funding outcomes. As recognized by a 1997 OECD study of
national innovation systems, new metrics and concepts are needed
and are being developed.1 8 2 These metrics, however, tend to focus on
financial and human capital inputs and intermediate knowledge

outputs, rather than on technological diffusion or on the incremental
value of intermediate knowledge outputs. As the OECD noted:
Measuring knowledge flows and mapping national innovation systems are still in the
initial stages as indicated by the immature level of most of the statistical indicators
The measurement of knowledge distribution and
discussed in this this report.
interaction is difficult because there is a lack of data and information regarding this
type of innovative activity. Conventional indicators (such as R&D expenditures,
patents, production and trade in high-technology products) are significantly more robust
but are able to draw only a rough picture of knowledge flows in the innovative process.
The OECD is now seeking to develop new types of innovation flow indicators which are
comparable across countries, including the mobility of human resources, the diffusion of
knowledge through publications and patents, and the characterization of innovative
firms, both in manufacturing and services. 183

FOUNDATION,
An
Essay
on
Man,
POETRY
180.
See
Alexander
Pope,
http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/174165 fhttps://perma.cc/manage/create] ("Hope springs
").
eternal in the human breast ....
181.
John Adams, John Adams Quotes, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS PROJECT,
[http://perma.cc/2FM8-Z5ZR] ("Facts
https://www.thefederalistpapers.org/founders/john-adams
are stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes, our inclinations, or the dictates of our
passion, they cannot alter the state of facts and evidence.").
182.
See OECD, supranote 129, at 42.
183.

Id.
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More recently, a legislatively mandated study by the NAS similarly
indicated that "[c]urrently available metrics for research inputs and
outputs are of some use in measuring aspects of the American
research enterprise, but are not sufficient to answer broad questions
about the enterprise on a national level."'18 4 Specifically,
[t]he output of government support for science and technology platforms is what
economists call an "intermediate good," in that industry builds upon these platforms and
the general stock of scientific knowledge to create innovations. For the most part, there
are no markets for these knowledge-based intermediate technology goods, which makes
impact assessment difficult. Nonetheless, they are essential to the productivity of
applied R&D....
[Diata on the outcomes of each of the many steps in a complex research project or
technological innovation often are lacking, and the appropriate performance metrics
may differ in different phases of a technology's development. Appropriate metrics also
may differ for each type of research and field of science.
Moreover, multiple areas of research often contribute to the development of a
technology, so that different measures and data may be needed to evaluate outcomes in
such areas as productivity, output, or overall societal benefit. Such measurement and
analysis require expertise that is not evident in many federal agencies....
[I]n the vast majority of cases, these outputs are inputs into further development. It is
virtually impossible to extrapolate the impact of a single research program forward
through multiple levels of development and commercialization because of the resulting
technology's combination with other technologies to make an eventual impact on
economic growth or some societal goal. But for research toward a broad technology goal,
such as clean energy, assessment of the relative contributions of research projects or
programs 18can
be made at a level sufficient to track progress toward the broad
5
objective.

In particular, metrics are lacking for: (1) technology developments
beyond immediate research products, which can include so-called
"platform" technologies that facilitate sequential innovation and
(2) downstream social outcomes (including marketed products) that
18
ultimately result from upstream inputs and intermediate outputs.

6

The developing STAR METRICS program is helpful as it seeks
to link datasets for research uses.18 7 STAR METRICS aggregates
substantial amounts of existing data already collected by agencies,
18 8
including intermediate outputs such as bibliometrics and patents.
The focus of STAR METRICS, however, is on how R&D funding affects
job creation, not on the value of the ultimate innovation outputs
themselves.18 9 Although such metrics are important,190 neither STAR

184.

FURTHERING AMERICA'S RESEARCH ENTERPRISE, supra note 26, at 51.

185.
Id. at 55, 66-67.
186.
See, e.g., id. at 55-71 (citing and reviewing various earlier studies and their
approaches).
187.
See, e.g., id. at 51 (recommending such linkage).
188.
See id. at 62-66.
189.
See id. at 64.
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METRICS nor the Small Business Innovation Research and Small
Business Technology Transfer programs I91 will develop the required
metrics on such outputs.
What is needed is more attention to developing metrics and

data on ultimate R&D outputs and on their valuations.
Evaluating the effectiveness of a research funding program requires a different strategy
and different forms of data gathering from those typically used by research funding
agencies and program managers.... [N]either the Executive Branch nor Congress has
an institutional mechanism for attempting cross-field comparisons or undertaking an
R&D budget portfolio analysis.
federal agencies dedicate resources within programs for retrospective
Moreover, few
192
evaluation.

Developing adequate metrics and collecting the data on which
they operate is not an easy task. To do so will take significant time,
Many of the needed
effort, institutional support, and expertise.

metrics will require qualitative judgments, such as international
benchmarking of the quality of basic science, as well as quantitative
judgments of the number and scope of publications, patents, citations,

and

other bibliometrics. I 93

It will also

be useful to

provide

standardization of metrics and of database formats across the
194
heterogeneous practices of agencies and fields of R&D.
What most appears to be lacking is tracking of downstream
product and process outputs to innovation-funding inputs and social
This
valuations of those outputs (beyond revenues generated).

tracking process would need R&D funding recipients to supply
See generally Bruce A. Weinberg, Comment, The Endless Frontier: Reaping What
190.
Bush Sowed?, in THE CHANGING FRONTIER: RETHINKING SCIENCE AND INNOVATION POLICY 367,
368 (Adam Jaffe & Benjamin Jones eds., 2015) (focusing on the shift to "soft money"-grant
funding-at universities); Paula Stephan, The Endless Frontier: Reaping What Bush Sowed?,
2013),
19687,
No.
Paper
Working
Research,
of
Econ.
Bureau
(Nat'l
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19687 [http://perma.cc/E766-REUR] (discussing the history of
university responses to federal R&D funding, including training and human capital formation).
See, e.g., SBJRISTTR INTERAGENCY POLICY COMM., SMALL BUSINESS INNOVATION
191.
RESEARCH (SBIR) & SMALL BUSINESS TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (STTR) PROGRAM INTERAGENCY
https://www.sbir.gov/sites/
13
(2014),
TO
CONGRESS
REPORT
COMMITTEE
POLICY
default/files/3_award size-ipc report.pdf [http:/perma.cc/SJNC-BZL8]; Sally J. Rockey, SBIR:
2012),
8
(July
6,
Success
of
Outcomes
and
Metrics
Defining
[http://perma.cc/
http://smrb.od.nih.gov/documents/presentations/2012/rockey-07112012.pdf
9HC9-SYDH]. See generally Jessie Romero, What We Don't Know About Innovation ... , 2012
https://www.richmondfed.orgl-/media/richmondfedorg/
12-14,
FOCuS
REGION
[http://perma.cc/7ASY-9HSK]
publications/researcblregionjfocus2012qlpdfcover story.pdf
(discussing small businesses and perceived comparative innovation advantages).
FURTHERING AMERICA'S RESEARCH ENTERPRISE, supra note 26, at 89-90.
192.
See id. at 117.
193.
Cf. Toole & Kuchler, supra note 21, at 22 (discussing expansion of reporting to other
194.
agencies and standardization of project identification processes and of coding and parsing of
data).
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significantly more reporting data, including potential trade secret
information, regarding what they developed with federal funding.
Agencies would have to develop new methods to value those reported
outputs. For just one example, if federal R&D funding generates a
new patented drug, the funding recipient may currently report
"utilization" information annually as required by the Bayh-Dole Act. 195
The report currently should include information on any product
developed under the patent and total revenues or licensing income
received. 196 But the report would not provide an indication of relative
therapeutic benefit of the drug compared to existing marketed
products and thus would fail to provide an indication of the innovation
value of the R&D. Similarly, a company that developed a new
patented biotechnology platform using federal grant funds might
report licensing income but would not identify the many products
developed by third parties under those licenses.
Of course, tracking such outputs to generate useful data would
be difficult, and valuing the outputs perhaps even more so.
Retrospective analysis must provide sufficient time for the
downstream outputs to develop and be observed, but not take so much
197
time that the information about benefits is too hard to obtain.
Further, agencies may be reluctant to impose such routine, costly, and
ongoing data-generation requirements on funding recipients, 19 as
doing so may be burdensome and thereby discourage private
participation in funding programs that further agencies' missions.
But not attempting to track outputs misses the critical
information needed to answer the important questions: What did the
funding actually lead to, and how useful was it compared to existing or
possible alternatives? Reaching the answers to those questions may
require not only additional data generation and evaluations, but also
195.
See 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(5) (2012) (stating that funding agreements shall reference the
"right of the Federal agency to require periodic reporting on the utilization or efforts at obtaining
utilization that are being made by the contractor or his licensees or assignees"); 37 C.F.R. §
401.14 (2015) (Department of Commerce regulations on utilization, which are applicable to
federal agencies). See generally University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act of 1980, 35
U.S.C. §§ 201-211 (2012).
196.
See 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(h) ("[R]eports shall include information regarding the status
of development, date of first commercial sale or use, gross royalties received by the contractor,
and such other data and information as the agency may reasonably specify.").
AND

See, e.g., ALBERT N. LINK & JOHN T. SCOTT, PLANNING REPORT 11-1: THE THEORY
197.
(2012),
PRACTICE OF PUBLIC-SECTOR R&D ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS, at iv

[http://perma.cc/X9KR-VHZ7]
http://www.nist.gov/director/planning/upload/report11-1.pdf
(discussing economic impact analysis of federal infrastructure investments).
198.
See, e.g., id. ("Project managers should maintain key contacts with the users of their
projects' outputs at all stages of the supply chain and communicate with those contacts about the
types of data that will be needed to estimate benefits. Ideally such data would be routinely
gathered in real time on an ongoing basis.").

2016] MISMATCH BETWEEN R&D FUNDINGAND INNOVATION

413

analysis
and
evaluations
of counterfactual
situations-the
hypothetical outcomes that would have resulted from alternative
funding arrangements that did not occur.1 99 Legislative mandates will
likely be needed to require agencies to compel private generation and
tracking of such data. In turn, political support will be needed for
such legislation. The growing acceptance of both the science of science
policy and the science of innovation policy may eventually lead to such
support.
B. Requiring Transparencyin and Documentation of
Innovation-FundingPolicy Decisions
As should be clear from the discussion of deviance in Part IV,
scholars and policy makers need to better understand how and why
innovation-funding decisions are actually made so as to improve
future decisions.
One way to do so, and to achieve greater
transparency in the process, is by requiring innovation-funding
decision makers at all levels of government to document the reasons
that underlie their particular choice of funding decisions. To do so,
this Article proposes both a new NIFA that would impose deliberative
obligations on the executive branch and legislative adoption of rules to
encourage greater deliberation over innovation-funding decisions.
Some such innovation-focused deliberation may already or
could in the future occur under the Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), 200 as modified by the GPRA
Modernization Act of 2010.201 The GPRA requires annual performance
plans and reports (more recently, in consistent, machine readable
formats) that require identification of goals and metrics regarding
their achievement for all budgeted program activities and further
require that those goals and metrics relate to agency strategic
plans. 20 2 However, the metrics that must be developed are not specific
to innovation R&D inputs and outputs, and nothing in the GPRA
199.
See id. at 1, 3 (discussing the "counterfactual methodology," as well as
"complementary techniques," such as "econometric models, productivity models, benchmarking
analysis, innovation surveys, expert panels and peer review, and network analysis").
200.
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-62 (1993).
201.
GRPA Modernization Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-352 (2010).
202.
See 31 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (2012); cf. Executive Office of the President, Office of
Management and Budget, OMB Circular No. A-11, Preparation, Submission, and Execution of
the
Budget
§
200-7
(June
2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default
files/omb/assets/allcurrent-year/s200.pdf (describing the role of required agency "Performance
Improvement Officers" to support "frequent data-driven reviews, at least quarterly, to learn from
experience, descriptive research, descriptive and predictive analyses, evaluations, and to decide
next steps to improve program performance"). See generally http://www.performance.gov/
[http://perma.cc/68V9-U3U5].
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requires either the specificity of innovation analyses contemplated or
for agencies to engage in alternatives consideration and to document
the reasons for their innovation funding form choices, as proposed
below.
A previous proposal by Professors Benjamin and Rai would
require changes to the structure of our innovation-policy executive
institutions, creating a centralized entity for analysis of
agency-innovation data evaluations and decision making. 2 3 Although
the Author believes that this proposal is a good idea, this Article more
minimally proposes that existing agencies and Congress consider
alternatives and document the reasons for their funding decisions.
The new NIFA thus would not require creation of a new executive or
legislative institution. 20 4 It would, however, require administrative
agencies and Congress to actually explain and document their
reasoning when making particular innovation-funding decisions, just
as is currently required of agencies in regard to environmental policy
under the NEPA.
The premise of the NEPA was to procedurally require agencies
to document in writing-subject to judicial review-assessments of
likely adverse environmental impacts of proposed measures and to
require consideration of alternatives in order to improve government
transparency and reach environmentally preferable decisions. The
NEPA's action-forcing requirement
has caused reconsideration, redesign, and even withdrawal of federal projects that
previously would have gone forward without effective challenge. It has forced the public
disclosure of plans and proposals which previously would have been shielded from public
scrutiny. It has required inter-agency exchange of information on plans and proposals
and has facilitated inter-agency cooperation on environmental projects where
competition and exclusiveness were once standard practice. 205

The theory of political behavior underlying the NEPA was that
government decision makers would narrowly focus on their agency's
missions without consideration of environmental factors, thus without
considering alternatives that might achieve mission goals while better

203.
See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 17, at 56-67.
204.
Benjamin and Rai would have their Office of Innovation Policy analyze agency
actions to determine when its innovation-promoting proposals operate in a flawed manner or at
cross purposes with those of other agencies and to assess when agencies could achieve their
mission goals "in a manner less damaging to innovation." Id. at 67. The latter function is
relevant to the present Article, but would be performed by the agencies in the first instance,
subject to existing judicial review under traditional, typically deferential, substantive review
doctrines.
205.
See, e.g., Lynton K. Caldwell, Beyond NEPA: Future Significance of the National
EnvironmentalPolicy Act, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 207 (1998).
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protecting the environment. 2 6 To compel such consideration, the
NEPA expressly requires agencies to research and produce in writing
a "detailed statement" (usually referred to as an EIS) indicating the
effects of proposed legislation or significant proposed actions and
considering feasible alternatives to such proposals. 20 7 The EIS process
thereby forces-under threat of judicial enforcement-agencies

to

explicitly consider possibilities that they would not otherwise evaluate
and to state their reasoning for choosing among the competing
alternatives.
Of course, agencies may avoid triggering EIS
of
requirements (and thus avoid meaningful consideration
alternatives) by erroneously issuing EAs containing a "Finding of No
Significant Impact" (FONSI) or by incorporating initial mitigation
measures so that the proposals do not trigger impacts that would rise
20 8
to a level of significance requiring a fuller analysis.

The

NEPA,

of course,

does

not

extend

to

legislative

deliberations, and efforts to create a Joint Environmental Committee

in Congress to centralize review of executive actions affecting the
environment were not adopted. 20 9 The executive branch nevertheless
sought to centralize some policy-making discretion of agencies under

the NEPA by adopting rules issued by the Council on Environmental
Quality. 210 Indeed, the lack of substantive rulemaking authority and
enforceable substantive requirements makes the NEPA less effective

206.
See, e.g., Lemon v. Geren, 514 F.3d 1312, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("The idea behind
NEPA is that if the agency's eyes are open to the environmental consequences of its actions and
if it considers options that entail less environmental damage, it may be persuaded to alter what
it proposed."). See generally SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK: THE
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM (1984). Of course,
NEPA also contained a statement of purposes that reflected a substantive policy choice by the
legislature to favor environmental protection values. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2012). That policy may
not have been implemented effectively by subsequent Congresses, executive agencies, and the
judiciary. See Caldwell, supra note 205, at 204-09; see also Sam Kalen, Ecology Comes of Age:
NEPA's Lost Mandate, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L. & PO'Y F. 113, 117-18 (2010).
207.
See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012).
208.
See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Whither NEPA?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 349
(2004) ("Rather than serving as the vehicle for fully informed agency decision-making, the EIS
operates as a penalty-default rule, creating an incentive for agencies to avoid its onerous
requirements by upgrading environmental standards at an earlier stage of project design.");
Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government's
Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 903, 932-37 (2002).
209.
See Caldwell, supra note 205, at 219-20. Similarly, efforts to strengthen NEPA's
substantive requirements, particularly in light of the judiciary's limitation of review under
NEPA to procedural matters, have not been enacted. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351 (1989); Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S.
223, 227 (1980); Caldwell, supra note 205, at 205-06, 220-22 (citing Marsh v. Oregon Natural
Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989)).
210.
See, e.g., Jamison E. Colburn, Administering the National Environmental Policy Act,
45 ENVTL. L. REP. 10287, 10313 (2015).
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in constraining agency behavior than it otherwise might be.
Borrowing from the NEPA experience, we need to create a
NIFA innovation impact statement requirement that would apply to
all federal agency actions having major innovation-policy effects.
Given the NEPA experience, such legislation would need to articulate
more clearly-and impose judicially enforceable standards to
govern-a national innovation policy and provide agencies with
substantive rulemaking power. Further, the structure and timing of
the analyses to be required of agencies under the NIFA should be
considered carefully to avoid the problems that the NEPA
the failure to
meaningfully
consider
encountered-namely,
alternatives or the avoidance of full evaluation requirements by
undertaking partial actions.
Unlike under the NEPA for environmental policy, Congress
must become more deliberate about innovation-funding decisions,
particularly in its legislative decisions regarding the structure of both
Better
agency mandates and innovation-funding authorities.
legislative evaluation of policies was featured among the critical
recommendations for innovation policy recently suggested in a NAS
study: "Congress should conduct its own evaluation of the federal
or
research portfolio through the budget, appropriations,
''
211
Congress, however, should also explain
authorization committees.
why it chooses particular innovation approaches from among the
alternatives. In particular, it should require that any bill reported out
of committee should include the equivalent of an innovation impact
analysis that considers alternatives and explains the reasons for
choosing particular innovation-funding forms, approaches, and
amounts. In this way, Congress can match its evaluations with its
record of deliberations to see how its choices play out over time.
To ensure that Congress considers innovation-funding
alternatives carefully, Congress could impose substantive deliberation
requirements on itself by adopting rules or laws. For example, the
House of Representatives in recent years required by rule that the
Constitutional authority for any bill be identified when reported out of
a committee. 212 In 1974, Congress and the President adopted

211.

NAS TRENDS, supra note 5, at 90.

See H.R. Doc. No. 111-157, at 622 (2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/HMAN212.
112/pdfJHMAN-112.pdf [http://perma.c/9NE4-J5BT] ("A bill or joint resolution may not be
introduced unless the sponsor submits for printing in the Congressional Record a statement
citing as specifically as practicable the power or powers granted to Congress in the Constitution
to enact the bill or joint resolution."). See generally HORACE COOPER & NATHANIEL STEWART,
CONSTITUTIONAL

AUTHORITY

STATEMENTS:

IN DEFENSE

OF

HOUSE

RULE XII

http://www.constitutingamerica.org/docs/WhitePaper.pdf [http://perma.cc/5L36-TFQ6].
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legislation establishing a Congressional budget process that:
(1) requires analysis and reporting of estimates of overall spending
and particular programmatic spending by the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) and by substantive committees as well as through
"scoring" by the budget committees; (2) bars, with many exceptions,
consideration of spending measures until the budget resolution
establishing budget targets for authorizing legislation has been
approved; and (3) prohibits, with many exceptions, substantive
committees from taking action that does not conform to the allocations
made in approved budget resolutions (as well as including
requirements for committees to propose "reconciliation" measures as
213
needed or impose "sequestration" to enforce the budget targets).
Congress also may adopt "special rules" to govern the process it will
use to reach its legislative approval decisions on the budget. 2 14 As a
deliberation
legislative
such
towards
measure
preliminary
requirements for innovation policy, Congress could require the CBO
and the General Accounting Office to study how R&D expenditures
and outcome assessments could best be incorporated into the
legislative budget, authorization, and appropriations processes.
VI. CONCLUSION

As demonstrated above, scholars and policy makers lack
substantial amounts of empirical information regarding the outputs to
R&D inputs that would help to determine what innovation-funding
form choices work best in particular situations for desired innovation
goals. Theories of innovation funding are highly dependent on such
missing information. Even if we obtained the missing information and
revised these theories in light of it, the political economy of innovation
funding would cause us routinely to deviate from what our theory
suggests would work best to achieve specific goals.
Innovation-funding policy thus may never be "optimal" either
in theory or in practice. But even if nothing is perfect, we can come
closer to achieving desired innovation outcomes if policy makers pay
closer attention to the forms of deviance that determine actual
innovation-policy decision making. There is no need to fear the
political, regulatory, globalized, institutional, psychological, temporal,
non-linear, and ideological dimensions of the science of innovation213.

See Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. §§

601-688 (1974);
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(2012),
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publish.cfm?pid=%26*2%3C4Q%3CS%3A%OA [http://perma.cc/Q5X3-Y5Z5]].
214.
See id. at 12-13; supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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funding policy and its discontents. 2 15 Rather, scholars and policy
makers should embrace and seek to better understand, measure, and
control them for our collective benefit.

215.
(1930).
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